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Abstract 
Envy is an unpleasant emotion that results from a negative social comparison, 
such as when people become aware of someone possessing a superior good. A central 
component of envy seems to be the desire for this superior fortune. Despite its important 
implications, empirical evidence on the psychological underpinnings of envious desire 
is lacking. Assuming that people are motivated to control their spontaneous envious 
reactions, I predict that envy and envious desire are strongest when resources to exert 
self-control are taxed. To evoke envy, participants were invited to a taste test. Some of 
them completed this taste test in the presence of other persons who were asked to taste a 
more attractive food. In Experiment 1, participants, who were in the presence of a more 
fortunate person assigned to taste chocolate, were more dissatisfied, angrier, and more 
envious the more intoxicated they were. This did not happen when they were asked to 
taste their less attractive chewy candy alone. In Experiment 2, participants envied their 
experimental partner, who was assigned to taste an attractive ice cream instead of the 
inferior biscuit assigned to them, most intensely under high cognitive load. Furthermore, 
they reported a higher willingness to pay for the ice cream than participants in any other 
condition. In Experiment 3, participants in an envy evoking experimental condition 
were most likely to spontaneously purchase the better product under high cognitive 
load. In Experiment 4, automatic approach behavior towards the more attractive food of 
the neighboring participant was increased under high cognitive load. The findings shed 
light on the determinants and the consequences of envy on economic judgments and 
decisions. 
vii 
Deutsche Kurzzusammenfassung 
Neid ist eine unangenehme Emotion, die nach einem negativen sozialen 
Vergleich entstehen kann. Als wesentliche Komponente wird dabei häufig das 
Verlangen nach dem Objekt, um das man jemanden beneidet, betrachtet. Obwohl ihm 
weit reichende Folgen zugeschrieben werden, sind die psychologischen Grundlagen 
neidvollen Verlangens bisher kaum empirisch erforscht. Unter der Annahme, dass 
Menschen motiviert sind, ihre spontanen Neidreaktionen zu kontrollieren, sagte ich 
vorher, dass Neid und Verlangen dann am stärksten sind, wenn Selbstkontroll-
Ressourcen beeinträchtigt sind. Um Neid auszulösen, wurden Versuchsteilnehmende 
gebeten, Geschmackstests durchzuführen. Manche befanden sich dabei in Gegenwart 
einer anderen Person, die ein attraktiveres Lebensmittel verkosten durfte. In Experiment 
1 waren die Teilnehmenden in Anwesenheit einer mit Schokolade besser gestellten 
Person dann umso unzufriedener und neidischer, je mehr Alkohol sie getrunken hatten, 
nicht aber, wenn sie ihr weniger attraktives Kaubonbon allein probieren sollten. In 
Experiment 2 beneideten sie einen Versuchspartner, der ein attraktives Eis und nicht die 
ihnen zugeteilten Kekse probieren sollte, vor allem dann, wenn sie kognitiv beansprucht 
waren. Zudem gaben sie die größte Zahlungsbereitschaft für das bevorzugte Eis an. In 
Experiment 3 war es unter gleichen Umständen am wahrscheinlichsten, dass sie das 
bessere Produkt spontan kauften. Schließlich war in Experiment 4 automatisches 
Annäherungsverhalten in Bezug auf das attraktivere Lebensmittel bei kognitiver 
Beanspruchung am größten, ohne kognitive Beanspruchung aber eher verringert. Die 
Ergebnisse beleuchten die Entstehungsbedingungen und die Art der Folgen, die Neid für 
Urteile und Verhalten hat. 
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Introduction and Theoretical Background 
Becoming aware of someone who possesses something better and more 
desirable must be an experience that everyone knows. For example, I admit having 
suffered the following situation more than once: I am visiting a restaurant to have dinner 
with family or friends. After contemplating the interesting options of the menu for some 
time, I choose the one that seems best to me. However, once the dishes arrive, 
disappointment strikes. The food of my neighbor looks so much more delicious! I want 
it badly. If only I could change my decision! 
The present thesis deals with envy-evoking situations like these and the envious 
desire that is instigated in them. Of course, even though it might be detrimental to 
dinner enjoyment, even the most serious case of “entrée envy” is unlikely to have grave 
consequences and may be easily coped with. However, in other situations, being aware 
of someone who is better off and the ensuing emotional reaction might change 
subsequent decisions and behavior drastically. What if people are about to decide which 
vacation to book, which apartment to rent, or which car to buy, and happen to be 
reminded that a colleague is better off than what they were aiming for? Will they choose 
a fancier hotel for their vacation, rent a more spacious apartment, or be willing to buy a 
more expensive car because of the envy they might experience? 
Throughout history, numerous scholars have argued that being aware of 
someone with a superior good instills the desire to obtain this good, and that this is one 
of the reasons to believe that envy has vast interpersonal, societal, and economic 
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consequences (Aristotle, trans. 1929; Foster, 1972; Frank, 2000; Girard, 1979, 2001; 
Rawls, 1971/1999; Schoeck, 1971). The biblical tenth commandment “You shall not 
covet your neighbor’s house” warns about the negative impact of envy. On the other 
hand, being motivated by the awareness of others’ greater fortunes has also been 
assumed to cause socially beneficial striving to attain better outcomes (Barnett, 1953; 
Corneo & Jeanne, 2001; Rawls, 1971/1999). Despite its important implications, 
experimental evidence on the psychological underpinnings of envy and envious desire is 
lacking. This dissertation seeks to reduce this empirical gap by applying a social 
cognitive approach to the investigation of envious reactions. 
The basic hypothesis underlying the present research is that becoming aware of a 
better-off other person evokes envy, entailing an impulsive striving for the superior 
good of the other. As people compare themselves spontaneously and without effort, 
envious desire should be an automatic reaction in response to superior others. 
Nonetheless, envy seems unlikely to be an inevitable outcome of such situations. Envy 
is a particularly negative emotion. It is painful, it threatens the positive self-views that 
people strive to maintain, and it is an emotion that others find very objectionable. That 
is why people should be motivated to control and alter their emotional reaction. In other 
words, being faced with a better-off other puts people in a situation in which they 
experience a conflict between their impulses and self-control. Thus, the emotional, 
judgmental, and behavioral consequences of a potentially envy-evoking situation should 
be determined by the outcome of this conflict. Therefore, envy and the envious urge to 
acquire the object that is causing it should prevail when people’s capacity to exert self-
control is constrained. 
Envy and Desire   3 
 
Envy and Desire 
It is because you focus on the prize 
of worldly goods, which every sharing lessens, 
that Envy pumps the bellows for your sighs. 
—Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy (1312/2003, p. 413) 
Components of Envy 
The question “What is envy?” is not an easy one to answer, as is evidenced by 
the lengthy and controversial scholarly debates about its defining features (for reviews, 
see e.g., Leach, 2008; Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007; R. H. Smith & Kim, 2007). Some 
initial clues may be provided by the relatively broad definition of the Merriam-Webster 
dictionary (2009), according to which envy is the “painful or resentful awareness of an 
advantage enjoyed by another joined with a desire to possess the same advantage.” This 
definition of envy is noteworthy in several regards. First of all, it emphasizes that envy 
is a negative emotional reaction. It feels bad to be envious. Furthermore, it implies that 
this reaction is the consequence of a social comparison with a superior comparison 
standard (i.e., we notice someone who possesses something desirable that we do not 
have). The definition also denotes that experiencing envy can entail very different 
negative feelings, such as pain or resentment. And finally, it highlights that part of envy 
is the desire for the superior fortune of another person that one has become aware of. 
Particularly the latter point is central to the present work. 
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Most scholarly analyses concur that envy is a multi-faceted emotion, a complex 
mixture of different experiences that may include feelings such as longing for the 
superior fortune, discontent, resentment, anger, and shame about one’s own inferior 
status and ill will (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007; R. H. Smith & Kim, 2007). Envy has 
to be distinguished from related emotions that are sometimes confused with it. An 
example is jealousy: While envy involves wanting to possess something that one lacks 
but another person has, jealousy occurs when one fears to lose an important relationship 
to a rival (Parrott, 2001; Parrott & Smith, 1993; R. H. Smith, Kim, & Parrott, 1988). 
Envy is also different from “righteous” indignation about inequality (Rawls, 
1971/1999). While being envious has been claimed to include a subjective feeling that 
one’s inferiority is undeserved (Ben-Ze'ev, 2001), “resentment proper” arises when 
another person’s advantage results from unfair treatment, especially when the unfairness 
can be determined by agreed on standards. In contrast, invidious resentment arises when 
a perceived advantage is painful but objectively fair (R. H. Smith & Kim, 2007; R. H. 
Smith, Parrott, Ozer, & Moniz, 1994). What complicates matters, however, is that an 
envious person might strategically seek evidence for injustice in order to rationalize and 
legitimize his or her emotional reaction and thus, envy might be transmuted into 
resentment (R. H. Smith & Kim, 2007). It is also important to distinguish envy from 
admiration. While envy shares some resemblance with admiration in that it is a reaction 
to perceiving someone with a superior fortune or accomplishment, admiration is a 
pleasant experience. In contrast, envy is frustrating (Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 
2009) and painful (Takahashi et al., 2009). Finally, it shall be noted that some theorists 
limit the term envy to emotional episodes that include the malicious ill will to destroy or 
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take away the advantage enjoyed by another person. As I will argue in more detail later 
(see Excursus: Malicious and Non-Malicious Envy, p. 9), I think that there is good 
reason to believe that it is warranted and more fruitful to define envy in a broader sense, 
such that emotional episodes in response to perceiving superior others are covered that 
may or may not lead to malicious thoughts and actions. 
Envious Desire 
While the theoretical debate about what constitutes the necessary elements of 
envy and how envy differs from related psychological phenomena is controversial and 
partly inconclusive, it is generally agreed upon that the longing for the superior 
possessions or characteristics of other people is a central element of envy: “Envy 
usually includes an intense longing for what another has” (Parrott, 2001, p. 311; see also 
Leach, 2008; Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007; R. H. Smith & Kim, 2007). Several 
empirical studies exploring the experiential components of envy support this assertion. 
For example, using a scenario approach, Bers and Rodin (1984) asked school children 
to imagine the emotional reaction of a child to another child which had superior abilities 
or superior possessions. The children saw the desire to have what the superior child had 
as most central to what the character of the story would feel. Similarly, when asked to 
distinguish a recalled episode of self-experienced strong envy from jealousy, 
participants of a study by R. H. Smith, Kim, and Parrot (1988) considered the 
motivation to improve, feeling wishful, and the longing for the superior fortune of the 
other as most characteristic of envy. They also associated feeling dissatisfied and 
inferior with envy. These results were replicated in another experience-sampling study 
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by Parrot and Smith (1993, Exp. 1) without pitting envy against jealousy. Participants 
vividly recalled and then described an episode in which they felt strong envy. 
Subsequently, they rated the extent to which the items of a lengthy list of feelings and 
emotional thoughts were descriptive of their experience. Participants reported the 
“longing for what another has” to be most characteristic of their experience. Also, 
feeling wishful towards the superior fortune of another person was seen as highly 
characteristic. As in R. H. Smith et al.’s (1988) study, another recurring theme among 
participants’ descriptiveness ratings was the disappointment and discontent about not 
having what the other has. For example, they reported frustration, unhappiness, and felt 
emotional pain. They also expressed having been upset, angry, and resentful. Thus, 
according to empirical investigations of how people experience envy, its most salient 
component seems to be the longing for what another person has, accompanied by 
feelings of discontent and anger. Based on these findings, for the present research, I 
pragmatically define envy as an unpleasant emotion following a social comparison to a 
better-off person that entails discontent and anger about lacking the person’s good 
fortune and desiring this fortune (for a similar conception, see Leach, 2008). 
But what is the specific role that desire plays in envy? Parrot (2001) speculates: 
[Envious] longing is brought on by focusing on the desired object or quality, by being 
aware of how much it is desired, and by being frustrated in this desire both by lacking it 
and by knowing that another person has been able to possess it. (p. 311) 
Thus, according to Parrot (2001), the importance of desire in envy is twofold: On the 
one hand, desire is a precondition for experiencing envy: People feel envious because 
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they become aware of someone possessing something they want themselves. On the 
other hand, being envious itself may cause the desire for the object or quality they see 
possessed by others: People want something because someone else has it. Some 
theorists (e.g., Young, 1987) even consider this as a necessary definitional element. 
According to this view, envy occurs to the extent that someone wants something just 
because another person possesses it.1 
The idea that the awareness of others superior fortune may instill the desire for 
these fortunes is an old one. In the Rhetorics, Aristotle (trans. 1929) argues that a form 
of envy – he called it “emulation” – spurs our motivation to gain what the other person 
has and to improve ourselves. This is one of the reasons why envy is often assumed to 
have vast interpersonal, economic, and societal consequences. Girard (1979, 2001) 
contends that people are fundamentally influenced by what he called “mimetic desire”: 
We want what belongs to our neighbor. To him, this is the very foundation of the human 
condition, the root of envy, rivalry, social conflict, and ultimately violence (Girard, 
2001). Economic consequences of envy have been stressed in what Douglas and 
Isherwood (1979) call the “envy theory of needs”, according to which consumers’ 
preferences can often be explained by envy rather than the intrinsic value of goods. In 
line with this view, marketers often aim at capitalizing people’s emotional responses by 
trying to evoke envy in consumers (Belk, 2008). Optimistically, Rawls (1971/1999) 
                                                 
1
 I agree to Miceli and Castelfranchi’s (2007) objection that it would be unwise to rule out cases in which 
one already desires and values the good regardless of a rival. However, a crucial feature of envy might be 
that becoming aware of someone else having what we want evokes and intensifies our desire for it. 
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believed that “emulative envy (…) leads us to achieve what others have” (p. 467) and 
“(…) moves us to strive in socially beneficial ways for similar things ourselves” (p. 
467). Indeed, being motivated by other’s superior fortune has been speculated to spur 
innovation (Barnett, 1953) and has been related to economic growth (Corneo & Jeanne, 
2001). On the other hand, excessive consumption and overspending caused by 
perceiving better-off others may also have severe detrimental effects on economies and 
the environment, such as rising consumer debts, the occurrence of bankruptcy, 
pollution, and the depletion of natural resources (Frank, 2000). A number of 
sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists believe that envy has had and 
continues to have a significant impact on culture and societies. For example, Foster 
(1972; see also Douglas and Isherwood, 1979) argues that complex beliefs, social 
norms, and rites have evolved to control envy and deflect the negative consequences of 
envious desire. An example is the fear of the “evil eye”, a belief that according to Foster 
(1972) serves to keep people from inciting envy in others by motivating them to conceal 
their fortunes. Further examples involve customs of the distribution of wealth, (e.g., 
tipping) or symbolic sharing (e.g., consolation prizes). Other authors (e.g., De la Mora, 
1987; Schoeck, 1971) even claim that egalitarianism and people’s striving for social 
equality is grounded in envious desire, causing profound effects on societies: According 
to Bertrand Russell’s (1930) famous dictum, “envy is the basis of democracy” (p. 83). 
An Evolutionary Account of Envy 
Even though some cultural differences in the expression of envy exist 
(Lindholm, 2008), it seems to be an almost universal human experience (Foster, 1972; 
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Schoeck, 1971). Why is this the case? And why is the desire to gain another person’s 
qualities or possessions so central to envy? From an evolutionary perspective, it has 
been argued that envy is an adaptive emotion (Hill & Buss, 2006, 2008). Presumably, in 
human history, reproductive success was determined by the relative standing in 
comparison to rivals in the social context and not by absolute success in fitness-related 
domains. According to Hill and Buss (2006), that is why natural selection has favored 
the development of a positional bias in human thinking: Individuals should be 
motivated by the desire to offset the advantage enjoyed by superior others and not by 
absolute amounts of status and resources. Furthermore, the emotional nature of this 
positional bias can be explained by strategic interference theory (Buss, 1989), which 
posits that negative emotions have been evolved to signal that there is an interference 
with a behavioral strategy aimed at ensuring adaptive fitness. According to this 
perspective, subjectively negative and upsetting emotional reactions serve to focus 
attention to the adaptive problem and motivate to reduce the strategic interference. 
Hence, envy might be an “emotional adaptation that has been shaped by selection to 
signal strategic interference in the quest for resource acquisition” (Hill & Buss, 2008, p. 
62). Thus, as other emotions, it might have evolved to prepare people to take urgent 
action in response to important situational needs (Frijda, 1986). I hypothesize that the 
default action tendency of envy is to try to attain the superior fortune as well. 
Excursus: Malicious and Non-Malicious Envy 
A distinction that is often discussed prominently in analyses of envy concerns 
the role of malicious ill will. Envy is often claimed to exist in two forms, one, which is 
10 Introduction and Theoretical Background 
 
free of hostility and does not contain any motivation to harm the person who possesses 
an advantage, and another one, which is dominated by this desire (e.g., Neu, 1980; 
Rawls, 1971/1999; Taylor, 2006). Parrot (2001) traces this distinction back to Aristotle 
(trans. 1929), who wanted to point out the different consequences that perceiving the 
superior fortunes of others can have, by distinguishing (morally good) emulation from 
(morally bad) envy. Aristotle assumed that emulation motivates people to improve 
themselves, while what he called envy motivates people to take their superior fortune 
away. Later, envy theorists have followed this notion by distinguishing “admiring” 
(Neu, 1980), “benign” (Rawls, 1971/1999), or “emulative” (Rawls, 1971/1999; Taylor, 
2006) envy from “malicious” (Neu, 1980), “destructive” (Taylor, 2006), or “proper” 
(Rawls, 1971/1999) envy. On the basis of this distinction, some authors limit their 
definition of envy to emotional experiences that contain malignant elements (e.g., 
Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007; R. H. Smith & Kim, 2007; Rawls, 1971/1999). 
However, as Parrot (2001) notes, these modern conceptualizations of envy 
depart from Aristotle’s original distinction to some extent and the change of meaning 
might sometimes confuse rather than enlighten the understanding of envy. For example, 
the term “admiring envy” could be misleading because even though it does not contain 
hostility, the focus of an envious reaction might be directed primarily at the envy-object 
and entail little admiration for its owner. That is why I follow Parrot’s (2001) preference 
for the terms non-malicious versus malicious envy. Another reason is that the words 
“admiring” and “benign” envy carry the connotation of a purely positive emotion. 
However, the emotion that Aristotle referred to by what he described with the word 
“emulation” was hedonically clearly negative, as he defined it as the pain caused by 
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seeing others possessing goods that people can in principle acquire themselves 
(Aristotle, trans. 1929). Thus, the original distinction is not primarily a psychological 
one, but rather one in moral terms. In other words, part of the confusion might stem 
from the level of analysis: Morally, malicious, and non-malicious envy are of course 
very different. However, this does not imply that they are not rooted in the same 
psychological phenomenon. Thus, to dismiss non-malicious envy episodes may obscure 
the psychological processes that govern the emergence of negative emotional reactions 
in response to upward comparisons. 
Furthermore, the quantitative literature on how people experience envy does not 
warrant the inclusion of malicious ill will as a necessary definitional criterion. If people 
are asked to characterize envy experiences, usually, malicious ill will is only moderately 
associated with them (Bers & Rodin, 1984; Parrott & Smith, 1993; Salovey & Rodin, 
1984, 1986; R. H. Smith et al., 1994). Reviewing this literature, Leach (2008) concludes 
that anger about a frustrated desire best characterizes envy. Furthermore, he argues: 
The anger in envy is not necessarily associated with malicious ill will, or the desire to 
harm the fortunate party. However, because people reported that anger was central to 
their experience of envy, it is clear that the envy in these studies was not benign. (p. 99). 
Recently, Van de Ven and colleagues (2009) directly assessed the differential 
characteristics of malicious and non-malicious envy, both by using latent class analysis 
of descriptions of envy experiences and by comparing emotional episodes of malicious 
and non-malicious envy, admiration, and resentment gathered by guided recall. When 
participants were asked to recall and characterize an envy episode, about half of them 
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described an experience that contained malicious ill will, while the other half described 
emotional episodes free of malicious elements. Non-malicious envy was associated with 
some admiration for the other person, but differed from pure admiration because – 
similar to malicious envy – it was highly related to frustration, inferiority, and felt 
unpleasant. Malicious envy had a somewhat higher resemblance with resentment by 
being associated with thoughts of injustice. However, resentment differed from 
malicious envy by containing less admiring feelings and even more intense negative 
affect toward the other person, presumably because the other person was willfully 
responsible for the unjust treatment. Importantly, malicious and non-malicious envy 
differed with regard to their motivational foci and action tendencies. Whereas malicious 
envy seemed to motivate damaging behavior towards the other person, the focus of non-
malicious envy seemed to be restricted to the improvement of one’s own position. Thus, 
based on these findings, one might speculate that the frustrated desire for a coveted 
object fuels both malicious and non-malicious envy and the motivation to even out the 
difference to the rival. However, whereas non-malicious envy “levels things up, 
malicious envy levels them down” (Van de Ven et al., 2009, p. 428). 
I second Rawls’ (1971/1999) opinion that malicious envy “is what emulative 
[i.e., non-malicious] envy may become under certain conditions” (p. 467). Evolutionary 
considerations suggest that trying to enhance one’s own position is a chief strategy to 
ensure competitive fitness (Buss, 1988) and possibly the default response when 
becoming aware of a superior rival. The alternative option to degrade the competitor 
(Buss & Dedden, 1990) not only seems much riskier but also does not lead to an 
improvement relative to other potential rivals. What determines whether envy only 
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motivates to improve oneself or shifts its focus to become malicious is yet to be 
determined. The many possible moderators include characteristics of the envious person 
(e.g., the intensity of his or her frustration, as argued by Rawls, 1971/1999), the envy 
evoking stimulus (e.g., whether it is at least potentially attainable for the envier or not, 
as in the case of a unique object or a fixed personal attribute), and of the rival (e.g., 
whether he or she is perceived to have caused the inferiority of the envier, see Parrott, 
2001). While certainly being a very interesting question and worthwhile field of 
research, it is beyond the scope of the current investigation. For the present purposes, it 
will suffice to say that the central motivational force underlying envy seems to be the 
frustrated and intensified desire for the object or attribute possessed by another person 
that may, but does not necessarily lead to malicious reactions. 
Impulse and Self-Control in Envy 
Die Regungen des Neides liegen (…) in der Natur des Menschen, und nur der 
Ausbruch derselben machen sie zu dem scheußlichen Laster 
—Immanuel Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten (1797, p. 134) 
Envy is often portrayed as the outcome of an impulsive reaction towards the 
superior fortune of others (e.g., Kant, 1797; Klein, 1957; Schoeck, 1971; R. H. Smith & 
Kim, 2007). For example, the medieval Christian philosopher Thomas Aquinas saw 
envy caused by an instinctive, spontaneous impulse, the “motus invidiae”, which is “a 
passion of sensuality (…) an imperfect human act where reason does not intervene” 
(cited in De la Mora, 1987, p. 29). According to Aquinas, only giving in and acting 
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upon this impulse should be considered a vice. In other words, he believed that people 
are able to (and should) control their spontaneous envious reactions. For several 
reasons, it is indeed likely that they will often try to do so. First of all, envy and its 
expression violate social norms (Foster, 1972; but see, Matt, 2003). In addition, other 
motives for emotional self-regulation2 (Fischer, Manstead, Evers, Timmers, & Valk, 
2004) are probably highly relevant in the case of envy, too. As outlined above, envy is a 
very unpleasant emotion; it contains intense frustration and is painful, thus, people 
should be hedonically motivated to do something about it. Furthermore, envy threatens 
the positive self-views that people strive to maintain (Tesser, 1988). That is why people 
will likely try to control not only their overt behavior but also their inner thoughts and 
feelings. In line with this view, neuroimaging studies have shown activation of brain 
areas related to emotional control as a response to unfavorable social comparisons 
(Joseph, Powell, Johnson, & Kedia, 2008). 
Even though the notion that self-regulatory efforts are important to understand 
envy has not yet been addressed directly, it is implicitly contained in many accounts of 
this emotion. For example, Elster (1999) observes that envy “is normally suppressed, 
preempted, or transmuted to some other emotion” (p. 165). It has also been argued that 
this may be an important reason why it so difficult to trace envy empirically: Envy “by 
its very nature, is obstinate in its opposition to investigation. The protean character of 
envy and its talent for disguise probably account for the infrequency of studies on the 
                                                 
2
 Following the example of Vohs and Baumeister (2004), I use the terms „self-control“ and „self-
regulation“ interchangeably. 
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subject” (Farber, 1966, p. 36). Similarly, according to R. H. Smith and Kim (2007, see 
also Parrot, 2001) envy is “an emotion that is best understood as an episode unfolding in 
time”, because envy’s “incipient feelings start a process that can take different paths as 
the envying person copes with the threatening nature of the emotion” (R. H. Smith & 
Kim, 2007, p. 56). 
From these descriptions of the workings of envy, it seems reasonable to apply 
the perspective of the dual process models of psychological functioning. Historic (e.g., 
Aristotle, trans. 1929) as well as contemporary conceptualizations of the human mind 
(for reviews, see e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Evans, 2008) see behavior determined by 
joint effects of automatic and controlled3 processes. Automatic processes are assumed to 
be fast, unintentional, effortless, and are believed to rely on associations and the high 
capacity of “lower order” cognitive systems. In contrast, controlled processes are 
described as slow, deliberative, as depending on effort and on a limited capacity of 
“higher order” cognitive systems, and are believed to generate behavior and decisions 
based on knowledge, facts, values, and social norms (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Evans, 
2008). The idea that emotion is closely tied to the first – the impulsive – system is put 
forward in several works that analyze how decision making and behavior is influenced 
by emotions as contrasted to the influence of more deliberate reasoning (e.g., S. Epstein, 
                                                 
3
 Besides the terms automatic and controlled (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977), other denotations have been 
proposed, for example, heuristic and systematic (Chaiken, 1980), associative and rule-based (E. R. Smith 
& DeCoster, 2000), spontaneous and deliberative (Fazio, 1990), experiential and rational (Epstein, 1994), 
hot and cold (Simon, 1983), impulsive and reflective (Strack & Deutsch, 2004) with largely overlapping 
but partly different meanings (see e.g., Evans, 2008). 
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1994; Evans, 2008; Hassin, Uleman, & Bargh, 2004; Haidt, 2001; Metcalfe & Mischel, 
1999; Vohs, Baumeister, & Loewenstein, 2007). 
A particular way in which automatic processes influence behavior is spelled out 
in Strack and Deutsch’s (2004) reflective impulsive model. Referring to social cognitive 
and neuroscience evidence, Strack and Deutsch argue that the behavioral impact of 
cognitive schemata activated in the “impulsive system” is mediated by two motivational 
orientations towards environmental stimuli: approach and avoidance (see e.g., 
Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990; Sutton & 
Davidson, 1997). An approach orientation is “the preparedness to decrease the distance 
between the person and an aspect of the environment” (Strack & Deutsch, 2004, p. 231), 
including “physical locomotion, instrumental action, consumption, or the imagination 
thereof” (p. 231). In contrast, an avoidance orientation is geared towards increasing the 
distance to the environmental stimulus in question. Based on the observation that an 
intense longing for the superior object (or attribute) seems to be the most central aspect 
of envy, I hypothesize that the initial impulse of envy is to approach the envy object. 
A dual process view is also inherent in many theories on the generation of 
emotion, particularly in those that belong to the family of appraisal models (for 
overviews, see e.g., Barrett, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 
2001). According to these models, emotions are based on how people appraise a given 
situation. The appraisal, i.e., the cognitive pattern of the situational construal, triggers 
the emotional response. Frijda (1986, 1988) describes this in his “law of situational 
meaning”, according to which different emotions arise in response to specific meaning 
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structures of events in a predetermined way. Importantly, the situation is not assumed to 
directly elicit an emotional response. Rather, the effect of an emotional stimulus is 
mediated by cognitive processing, which then elicits the emotion in a largely automatic 
fashion. Appraisals reflect how the immediate external environment of people is related 
to their inner beliefs, values, goals, and concerns. Appraisal theorists hold that people 
continuously and automatically assess the personal relevance of situations (e.g., 
Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). In more recent 
conceptualizations, controlled processing is usually assumed to be able to affect these 
processes to some extent and interact with automatic appraisals in shaping the emotion 
(Clore & Ortony, 2000; Frijda & Zeelenberg, 2001; C. A. Smith & Kirby, 2001). 
Particular importance of reflective operations is seen in attempts to regulate the 
emotional response (cf., Barrett et al., 2007; E. R. Smith & Neumann, 2005). 
Automaticity (and Mental Control) of Social Comparisons 
The emotional meaning structure of envy derives from a social comparison with 
a superior other. Psychological research has demonstrated that social comparison is a 
fundamental and ubiquitous element of human cognition (Festinger, 1954; Mussweiler, 
2003; Suls & Wheeler, 2000). Consequentially, comparative processing has been shown 
to be a highly trained and efficient cognitive operation (Mussweiler & Epstude, 2009). 
Whenever social information is processed, this information seems to be 
compared to salient comparison standards. For example, when forming a judgment 
about another person, people spontaneously compare this person to themselves 
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(Dunning & Hayes, 1996). Similarly, when people think about themselves they 
spontaneously compare with other people (Mussweiler & Rüter, 2003), even when these 
comparison standards have been presented outside of conscious awareness (Blanton & 
Stapel, 2008; Mussweiler, Rüter, & Epstude, 2004). 
The human proclivity to engage in comparison is so pervasive that also when 
another person is clearly not a relevant comparison standard, people involuntary 
compare. Most informative in the present context is research of Gilbert, Giesler and 
Morris (1995), in which participants saw a confederate perform better or worse in a 
psychological test than themselves. Additionally, while being exposed to the 
comparison information, the mental capacity of some participants was depleted by 
having to rehearse an 8-digit number. In this experimental condition, participants’ self-
evaluation was affected by their neighbor, even though these comparison standards were 
irrelevant because they had received additional training. In contrast, participants without 
cognitive load were able to correct the biasing influence of the non-diagnostic 
comparison. The authors conclude that people compare “even when they don't really 
want to, and when that happens, they may have little choice but to mentally undo the 
comparisons they made. Such efforts are not always successful” (pp. 232-233).  
Thus, while people may engage in deliberate and effortful comparisons 
(Festinger, 1954), much social comparison activity can be assumed to occur 
spontaneously, without intention, and without effort. Therefore, I contend that when 
people are confronted with a superior other, they will engage in comparison as a default, 
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and subsequent cognitions, emotional responses, and behavior may be shaped by the 
outcome of this comparison, unless, they are able to control its influence. 
Controlling Envy 
People can deliberately control their emotional responding by employing a wide 
variety of strategies. According to an influential model of emotional regulation, the 
timing of attempts to regulate emotional responding is crucial to understand their mode 
and their consequences (Gross, 1998a, 1998b; Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Antecedent-
focused emotion regulation is enacted early during the generation of the emotion or 
even before an emotion unfolds. For example, people can strategically select situations 
(e.g., avoiding to see the neighbor’s new car). They can also try to modify the situation 
(e.g., purchase a new car themselves). Once they are in an emotional situation, they can 
influence which aspects of the situation they attend to (e.g., by distracting themselves 
from or by focusing on a specific emotional trigger). After the situation has been 
selected and attended to, people can try to change the way they think about it, for 
instance, in terms of their capacity to cope with the demands of the situation. A form of 
cognitive change that has received much empirical attention is reappraisal, which is 
aimed at altering the emotional impact of specific stimuli by changing their meaning. 
Reappraisal has been shown to be effective in altering affective, cognitive, and 
psychophysiological consequences of emotional stimuli (Gross, 1998a, 1998b, 2002). 
Once the emotional response has fully unfolded, people can engage in response-focused 
emotion regulation to lower (or amplify) their physiological, experiential, or behavioral 
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responding, for example, by trying to suppress emotion-expressing behavior, or by 
using relaxation techniques. 
As alluded to above, in the case of envy, emotion regulation processes are often 
implicitly assumed to play a very important role, be it the often described 
transmutations of envy into other, morally legitimate emotions such as “righteous” 
resentment (an example of a reappraisal process), or the vigorous efforts to hide the 
envy from others (an example of emotional suppression). Attempts to alter the negative 
experience of envy or to inhibit its expression may be responsible for yet another 
phenomenon that is related to envious desire and seems thus to be particular relevant for 
the present work. To reiterate, a central assumption underlying this research is that the 
intense longing for something one lacks is at the core of experiencing envy. Apparently 
however, the superior good or characteristic of another person is not always valued 
highly. Rather, the perception of someone superior may lead to outright disparagement 
of the potentially envy-evoking stimulus. Such a denigration of an envy-attribute can be 
illustrated by a memorable description of the narrators great-aunt in Proust’s novel 
Swann’s Way: “Whenever she saw in others an advantage, however trivial, which she 
herself lacked, she would persuade herself that it was no advantage at all, but a 
drawback, and would pity so as not have to envy them” (cited in Taylor, 2006, p. 44). A 
devaluation of something desirable one is aware of but cannot attain is idiomatically 
referred to as “sour grapes”, alluding to Aesop’s fable in which the Fox despises some 
high hanging grapes as sour because he is unable to reach them. Thus, the human 
capacity for reappraisal or, more specifically, rationalization (e.g., Elster, 1985, 1999; 
Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002; McGuire & McGuire, 1991) may often be at work in 
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potentially envy-evoking situations. The fact that the metaphor “sour grapes” is 
sometimes misused as a synonym for envy (Garner, 1998) might point to the importance 
of this phenomenon in such situations. 
The great-aunt in Swann’s Way escapes the harm of being aware of someone 
with a superior fortune by convincing herself that the enviable characteristic is in fact 
something negative. Elster (1985, 1999) discusses the cognitive and behavioral 
consequences of situations in which people are reminded that they are unlikely to attain 
something they desire as a special case of dissonance reduction (Festinger, 1957). To 
reduce the tension resulting from such a situation, people may change the world or 
simply accept that the world is not the way they want it to be. They might also pursue in 
wishful thinking and imagine that they have in fact fulfilled their desire. Finally, they 
might engage in a rationalization strategy that Elster (1985) calls “adaptive preference 
formation”, in which they change their preferences to cease to desire what they 
originally wanted or even to despise it. The latter notion is what he equates with “sour 
grapes”. One might also expect the use of the complementary rationalization strategy 
“sweet lemons” (e.g., Kay et al., 2002; McGuire & McGuire, 1991), according to which 
the perceived desirability of the own (originally “bitter”) outcome is intentionally 
increased. 
However, in addition to rationalization, other mechanisms might also lead to the 
expression of negative evaluations of an unattainable stimulus and thus to “sour 
grapes”. Impression management (e.g., Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1971; Tesser 
& Paulhus, 1983) is a prime candidate, particularly in situations that may potentially 
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evoke envy: People might publicly express disdain for the superior fortune of another 
person in order to convince others that their status remains superior or at least equal to 
their rival, leaving open the possibility that they privately still desire the stimulus.4 
To conclude, people are by no means doomed to be envious or to act on their 
envious impulses. To evade or counter the effects of a potentially envy-evoking 
situation, they may engage in emotion regulation, using a variety of different ways. 
Accordingly, even though a central component of envy seems to be the increased desire 
for the superior fortune of another person, this desire will not always dominate 
behavior. In fact, situations that may potentially give rise to envy may also result in the 
expression of a negative evaluation of this fortune. 
Moderators of Impulsive and Reflective Behavior Determination 
From a dual process perspective, the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral 
outcome of an envy situation depends on the interplay of automatic and controlled 
processes. An important question is what determines whether the envious impulse will 
                                                 
4
 Rationalization is a mechanism that fits the description of what social cognition researchers call 
motivated reasoning, which entails the selective processing of information to arrive at particular 
conclusions (e.g., Kay et al., 2002; Kruglanski, 1996; Kunda, 1990). Clearly, impression management is 
also the result of motivated social cognition. To be sure, it is also conceivable that an object or quality 
that has evoked envy may be regarded as less positive or even acquire negative valence without being the 
direct objective of a motivational process, however. For example, a less positive evaluation might result 
from evaluative conditioning (e.g., De Houwer, 2007), as the object or quality is paired with a very 
negative emotional experience. 
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prevail or whether it will be tamed by reflective operations.5 A first precondition for the 
latter possibility is the motivation to control envy. Evidence supporting the role of 
motivation for the deliberate inhibition of automatic responses stems from research on 
prejudice, which shows that motivation moderates the relationship between automatic 
attitudes and self-reported judgments (M. Olson & Fazio, 2004) and behavior (Dasgupta 
& Rivera, 2006). As argued before, because envy is a negative emotion in several 
respects, people should be highly motivated to regulate it. 
If people are motivated to exert self-control in an envy-provoking situation, a 
conflict between automatic and controlled determinants evolves. Now, another 
important precondition becomes relevant: People need the capability to exert self 
control. A growing body of research has identified dispositional and situational factors 
that affect whether people are successful at resisting their impulses and in altering 
emotional responding (Baumeister & Vohs, 2004; Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009). 
For example, the capacity to exert self-control has been shown to be a resource that can 
be depleted, such that exerting self-control in one task disrupts people’s ability to 
engage in self-control in subsequent tasks (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 
1998; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000). In a related vein, self-control performance is also 
hindered by concurrent manipulations of mental capacity, such as cognitive load, time 
                                                 
5
 In line with most of the research on this topic, I equate emotion regulation with deliberate processing. 
However, it has to be acknowledged that emotion regulation can be automatized (Mauss, Bunge, & Gross, 
2007). This should particularly be the case if an individual has repeatedly used a regulatory strategy in a 
given situation (Bargh & Williams, 2006), but automatization can also be created strategically (Schweiger 
Gallo, Keil, McCulloch, Rockstroh, & Gollwitzer, 2009). 
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pressure, emotional distress, low blood sugar level, or alcohol intoxication (for a review, 
see Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009).  
A common element of many of these factors has been speculated to be the 
impairment of executive working memory functions (Hofmann et al., 2009). Evidence 
supporting this assertion is provided by research that relates interindividual differences 
in working memory capacity to self-control ability. For example, in a study by 
Schmeichel, Volokhov, and Demaree (2008), participants with higher working-memory 
capacity were better in suppressing negative emotions, had a higher capability to 
appraise emotional stimuli in an unemotional manner, and consequentially were less 
affected by them (see also Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008). 
Experimental evidence stems from research showing that controlling emotions has 
detrimental effects on the resources needed for higher-order cognitive functioning 
(Baumeister et al., 1998; Richards & Gross, 2000). For instance, Schmeichel (2007) 
found that regulating emotion reduced working memory span in a subsequent task. 
Finally, there is research showing that cognitive load hinders emotion regulation. For 
example, participants of Wegner, Erber, and Zanakos (1993) were unable to alter their 
emotional state while rehearsing a complicated number. Relatedly, participants’ 
emotional state had a stronger impact on judgments when mental capacity was reduced 
by a similar cognitive load manipulation (or time pressure) in a study by Siemer and 
Reisenzein (1998). Thus, people should be most likely to feel envy and act on their 
envious impulse, when their mental capacity to exert self-control is taxed. 
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The Present Research 
The main theoretical arguments and hypotheses of this dissertation can be 
summarized as follows: Because social comparisons are carried out effortlessly and 
without intention, even with irrelevant comparison standards, I argue that becoming 
aware of others who possess a superior good produces a spontaneous envy reaction. 
Furthermore, based on experiential envy research and evolutionary theory, I contend 
that a core element of envy is the intensified and impulsive desire for the superior good, 
which should be reflected in judgments about it and behavior directed at it, such as 
automatic approach behavior or spontaneous purchases. However, because envy is 
affectively and normatively a negative emotion, people should be highly motivated to 
control their emotional responses. For this reason, envy and its affective, cognitive, and 
behavioral consequences should be only evident in situations in which people’s ability 
to exert self-control is hindered. 
Thus, all other things being equal, people whose mental capacity is constrained 
while facing a better-off neighbor should feel more discontent and anger about their 
outcome, and report to be more envious than those who do not face a better-off 
neighbor. Furthermore, only when facing a better-off neighbor they should be willing to 
pay more for the good they are deprived off, they should be more inclined to purchase 
this good, and should show signs of a stronger automatic approach tendency towards it. 
In contrast, when people have the mental means to regulate their emotional response, 
there should be no evidence of increased envy and desire. The use of some specific 
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emotion control strategies may even result in a negative evaluation of the superior good, 
and thus in signs of “sour grapes”. 
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Empirical Evidence 
Overview 
The aim of the presented research was to investigate experimentally whether 
envy and the desire for another’s superior good are more intense when the capacity to 
exert self-control is constrained. To induce envy, a seemingly innocuous treatment was 
used in all four studies: Participants in the crucial experimental condition were deprived 
of an attractive food that an experimental partner was about to taste. This experimental 
condition was compared to conditions in which participants were deprived of the 
attractive food as well but were alone, or to conditions in which participants had an 
experimental partner who was endowed equally or was worse-off. 
Experiment 1 was conducted in a field setting and tested whether the level of 
alcohol intoxication was related to the intensity of the negative emotional reaction in 
response to the envy evoking experimental condition. Experiments 2 to 4 investigated 
the impact of cognitive load on envious responding in a laboratory setting. Experiment 2 
tested whether high cognitive load would lead to more envy and a higher willingness to 
pay for the envy evoking object. Experiment 3 extended this investigation to actual 
spontaneous purchasing behavior. Finally, Experiment 4 employed a response latency 
based measure of impulsive approach behavior to provide direct evidence for the 
increased inclination to acquire the envy-evoking stimulus. 
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Experiment 1 
In the first Experiment, I examined how alcohol intoxication is related to the 
intensity of the emotional response in an envy-provoking situation. I hypothesized that 
alcohol impairs self-control and thus, leads to a stronger emotional response when faced 
with a better-off neighbor. 
This conjecture can be substantiated by much research on the psychological and 
pharmacological effects of alcohol intoxication, which has demonstrated that alcohol 
leads to dysregulated behavior across a wide variety of domains (for a meta-analysis see 
Hull & Bond, 1986). Pharmacological explanations of alcohol effects emphasize 
alcohol’s limiting influence on attentional capacity (Steele & Josephs, 1990) and its 
impact on brain areas related to self-control (Lyvers, 2000). In this vein, amounting 
evidence shows that alcohol affects emotions primarily by its effect on higher 
information processing centers that participate in “top-down” regulation of emotional 
responses (Curtin & Lang, 2007). Relatedly, it has been demonstrated that alcohol 
influences psychological functioning pharmacologically by impairing executive control 
processes such as response inhibition, while leaving bottom up processes such as the 
activation and implementation of responses intact (Curtin & Fairchild, 2003; Fillmore & 
Vogel-Sprott, 1999). Psychological explanations stress the role of expectancies in 
alcohol effects. According to this view, alcohol can change the perception of social 
norms, such that people think that it is permissible to violate social norms when being 
drunk because alcohol itself offers the excuse for doing so (Marlatt & Rohsenow, 1980). 
In line with both accounts, acute alcohol intoxication has diverse judgmental and 
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behavioral consequences related to the failed inhibition or correction of automatic 
responses. For example, alcohol disrupts the conscious inhibition of impulsive 
determinants of food consumption (Hofmann & Friese, 2008), hinders the reflective 
adjustment of intuitive judgments (Epley & Gilovich, 2006), leads to greater behavioral 
change in response to salient environmental cues (MacDonald, Fong, Zanna, & 
Martineau, 2000), and can foster aggressive behavior in response to provocations 
(Giancola & Corman, 2007). Therefore, I hypothesize that alcohol intoxication does not 
alter the spontaneous emotional reaction in a situation that is likely to evoke envy. 
However, alcohol should impair the ability or the motivation to consciously control the 
envious response. 
To recruit participants who varied in their level of alcohol intoxication, passers-
by were approached during the climax of the Cologne carnival, which involves drinking 
for many revelers. Under the guise of research on taste judgments, participants were 
invited to take part in a taste test involving two differentially attractive candies, an 
unattractive chewy candy and an attractive box of chocolates. All participants were 
asked to taste the unattractive candy and were thus deprived of the attractive candy. In 
the better-off neighbor condition, they did so in the immediate presence of a confederate 
who tasted the attractive candy. In the no-neighbor condition, they did so without the 
presence of a confederate. Given that participants in this condition knew that other 
participants would receive the chocolate, they could in principle have become envious 
too. However, because social comparisons with specific other persons have a greater 
impact (Buckingham & Alicke, 2002), I expected envy most likely to occur in the 
better-off neighbor condition. Subsequently, participants responded to items assessing 
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the intensity of their negative emotional experience. Finally, participants’ blood alcohol 
concentration (BAC) was measured with a breathalyzer. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Participants were 38 people (20 females, 17 males; age 18 to 38; 1 missing 
value) who – during the Cologne street carnival – passed by the main university 
cafeteria, which is located closely to a popular carnival party spot. They were assigned 
to a better-off neighbor condition or a no-neighbor condition. Measured BAC served as 
a quasi-experimental variable. 
Procedure 
Participants were invited to a “taste test of candy” aimed at studying the 
“influence of mood and alcohol consumption on taste judgments.” The experiment was 
conducted in the form of a standardized interview and the responses were audio-
recorded. To lend credibility to the cover story, participants were asked to indicate their 
current mood and how many alcoholic beverages they had drunk that day. This data was 
not analyzed. Participants were then told that they would taste one of two different sorts 
of candy, which were shown to them: A box of brand chocolate confection (Nestlé 
Choco Crossies) and a single piece of no-name chewy candy. The chocolate was 
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superior in terms of size, objective value, and desirability6. The experimenter added that 
for sanitary reasons they would receive a fresh box if they were assigned to taste the 
chocolate and that they could keep the rest of it. 
In the better-off neighbor condition, participants were told that the taste tests 
would be conducted in pairs, and pointed to another participant (a confederate). The 
experimenter explained that in order to rule out the influence of individual taste 
preferences and effects of the daytime, the products would be assigned randomly by 
drawing lots. The participant was asked to choose one of two paper slips, unfold it, and 
read out loud what was written on it. Unbeknownst to the participants, both paper slips 
read “Chewy Candy”. While the participant read out his or her lot, the confederate 
unfolded the second paper slip and responded “Choco Crossies”. 
In the no-neighbor condition, participants were also assigned to taste the chewy 
candy (and not the chocolate) offering the same explanation and using the same 
procedure (ostensible lottery), with the sole exception that they were not paired with 
                                                 
6
 A pretest was conducted to select pairs of foods differing in their desirability. Thirty people who were 
leaving or entering the university cafeteria were recruited to complete a short questionnaire. They were 
asked to indicate how strongly they would like to eat or drink each of a series of different foods at this 
moment. Participants provided desirability ratings on 9-point scales ranging from 1 (“not at all”) to 9 
(“very much”). For Experiment 1, “Choco Crossies” (a chocolate confection; M = 5.30, SD = 2.71) was 
selected as superior product in combination with the comparatively less desirable “chewy candy” (M = 
3.83, SD = 2.44), t(29) = 4.17, p = 10-4. For Experiment 2, “Häagen-Dazs ice cream” (M = 7.20, SD = 
2.19) was selected as superior product in combination with the comparatively less desirable “Leibniz 
butter biscuit” (M = 5.13, SD = 2.58), t(29) = 4.15, p = 10-4. For Experiments 3 and 4, “smoothie” (M = 
5.43, SD = 2.74) was selected as superior product in combination with the comparatively less desirable 
“sauerkraut juice” (M = 1.93, SD = 1.76), t(27) = 7.19, p = 10-7. Different degrees of freedom are due to 
missing values. 
32  Empirical Evidence 
 
another participant and that no reference to other participants was made during the 
assignment.  
To assess the intensity of their emotional response, all participants first rated 
how happy they were about receiving the chewy candy (reverse coded), then how angry 
they were about not receiving the box of chocolate, and finally how strongly they 
envied the persons who received the box of chocolate on 10-point scales (1 = not at all, 
10 = extremely). The ratings were internally consistent (Cronbach’s α = .74), and thus 
averaged to a single emotional response index. Participants then tasted the chewy candy 
and indicated how much they liked the taste of the candy on a 10-point scale (1 = not at 
all, 10 = extremely good). Finally, participants’ BAC was measured by an ACE3000 
(ACE GmbH, Freilassing, Germany) breathalyzer. Before the measurement, participants 
rinsed their mouths with water to remove residual alcohol. A new disposable 
mouthpiece was used for each participant. At the end, every participant received a box 
of chocolate as unannounced compensation. 
Results 
The dependent variable of this Experiment was the intensity of the negative 
emotional reaction in response to not receiving a more desirable product in the taste test. 
I hypothesized that participants who were facing a better-off neighbor would react more 
negatively the more intoxicated they were. In contrast, for participants who were alone, 
I did not expect the negative emotional response to covary with the level of intoxication. 
Participants in this condition should be hardly envious and respond, at most, mildly 
negative to being deprived of the somewhat superior good. Hence, they should be less 
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inclined to engage in emotional self-control and should therefore be less affected by the 
impairing effects of alcohol intoxication. 
 
 
Figure 1. Intensity of participants’ negative emotional response after not receiving a 
superior product on a scale from 1 (none) to 10 (extremely) as a function of BAC 
(percent by volume) and experimental condition (Experiment 1; n = 19 per 
experimental condition). The lines depict the simple regression slopes of the better-off 
neighbor and no-neighbor participants. 
As shown in Figure 1 and in line with the predictions, the more intoxicated 
participants were, the more negatively they reacted to not being assigned to taste the 
more desirable food in the better-off neighbor condition, r(19) = .62, p = .01. 
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Importantly, in the no-neighbor condition, this was not the case, r(19) = -0.16, p = .50. 
To analyze this pattern, neighbor condition (better-off neighbor condition dummy coded 
with value 1, no-neighbor condition coded with 0), BAC and a neighbor × BAC 
interaction term were entered in a multiple regression predicting the negative emotional 
response. The regression resulted in a significant neighbor × BAC interaction, β = .62, 
t(34) = 2.63, p = .01. The neighbor and BAC main effects were not significant |ts| < .73, 
ps > .47. 
For exploratory reasons, I also analyzed the taste judgments. If participants 
coped with experimental situation by rationalizing their outcome, a “sweet lemons” 
effect might emerge for those participants who had the cognitive means to do so at their 
disposal. Thus, one could expect a negative correlation of the taste judgment and 
participants’ BAC, particularly in the better-off neighbor condition due to its higher 
potential for negative affective reactions. However, the correlation of taste judgment 
and BAC was neither significant in the better-off neighbor condition, r(18) = -.19, 
p = .45, nor in the no-neighbor condition, r(18) = .01, p = .97. The corresponding 
regression analysis did not yield interactions or main effects for neighbor condition and 
BAC, |ts| < .61, ps > .55. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 confirm that discontent with an inferior outcome is 
particularly likely when encountering a better-off other while self-control resources are 
taxed. The more intoxicated they were, the more negatively participants in the better-off 
neighbor condition reacted (as indicated by a measure combining their unhappiness 
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about the inferior food, their anger about not receiving the superior food, and their 
envy). 
Given the present experimental design, it is not possible to estimate the relative 
contribution of pharmacological and/or expectancy effects of alcohol consumption to 
this result. As contended before, the possible violation of social norms is not the only 
reason to control envy. People should also be motivated to control envy in order to 
avoid the negative hedonic state and maintain a positive self-view. One might argue that 
both of the latter motivations are less likely to be altered by alcohol expectancy effects. 
However, in order to elucidate the degree to which a physiologically diminished ability 
to engage in self-control, motivational deficits, or both are responsible for the more 
negative reaction, a balanced placebo design (Hull & Bond, 1986) – in which alcohol 
dose and presumed alcohol consumption are orthogonally varied – would be needed. 
Within the scope of the present research, it may be sufficient to say that because people 
are usually aware of the fact that they have consumed alcohol, the comparison of people 
differing in self-induced alcohol intoxication reflects the ecological validity of the 
findings. 
The analysis of the taste judgments did not support the notion that participants’ 
efforts to cope with the envy-evoking situation resulted in a “sweet lemons” effect. 
There was no significant negative relationship of taste judgments and BAC in the better-
off neighbor condition, as one could predict if participants used this particular 
rationalization strategy. The absence of this finding might be due to the small sample 
size (a problem that was aggravated by several missing values in this measure). 
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However, participants may also have responded to the envy-evoking situation by using 
a different coping strategy, leaving their evaluation of their inferior food unchanged. 
Of course, the quasi-experimental design of Experiment 1 poses challenges to 
the internal validity of the findings. Participants varying in alcohol intoxication may 
have differed in other psychological variables too. In the remaining studies, full 
experimental designs were used in a more controlled laboratory setting. To tax 
participants’ capacity to exert self-control, a cognitive load manipulation was employed 
in Experiments 2, 3, and 4. 
Experiment 2 
Having established that spontaneous negative social comparisons lead to envy 
under conditions that foster disinhibited responses, Experiment 2 explored whether 
evoked envy would heighten the inclination to acquire the superior good. If becoming 
aware of a better-off other leads to envious desire for the envied good, people should be 
willing to spend more money for the superior good, especially, when they are not able 
to control their envious reaction. 
Pairs of unacquainted participants were invited to perform taste judgments in the 
laboratory. To tax their mental resources, a standard cognitive load manipulation 
(Gilbert et al., 1995; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988) was used. In the high load 
condition, participants had to remember a difficult 8-digit number. In the low load 
condition, this number was easy to remember. Participants in the better-off neighbor 
condition were assigned to taste a small package of butter biscuits, while their neighbor 
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(who was in the worse-off-neighbor condition) was assigned to a more desirable ice-
cream sundae. Participants in the equal-neighbor condition were assigned to test both 
foods, as did their partner – only in a different order. Before they tasted the foods, 
participants rated how strongly they envied their experimental partner and indicated 
their willingness to pay for each of the two products.  
I predicted that participants should be most envious in response to having a 
neighbor with a superior food when experiencing high cognitive load. Those 
participants should also be willing to pay more for the ice cream than participants in the 
remaining experimental conditions. Furthermore, given that I hypothesized a causal 
relation of envy and the inclination to acquire the desired good, envy should statistically 
mediate the effect of the neighbor condition on the amount of money participants are 
willing to pay for the ice cream. Because participants in the low load condition are 
likely to control their envious response, this mediation should be limited to participants 
in the high load condition. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Participants were 116 adults (82 female, 27 male; age 20 to 44; 9 missing 
demographics values) who had been approached at a campus of the University of 
Cologne or recruited from a pool of undergraduate students who had given their 
approval to be contacted for requests to participate in psychological studies. They were 
assigned to a 3 (neighbor: better-off vs. equal vs. worse-off) × 2 (cognitive load: high 
vs. low) between subjects design. They received 4 Euro as compensation. 
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Procedure 
Pairs of unacquainted participants were invited to participate in a study about 
“factors that affect product evaluations and taste judgments”. They were seated in front 
of two adjacent computers at a distance of about 2 m. The computers were used to 
present the instructions and measures. To lend credibility to the cover story, participants 
were asked to indicate how much time had passed since their last meal. Furthermore, 
they rated the strength of their hunger, of their thirst, and of their appetite for several 
categories of food. This data was not analyzed. Then, participants saw pictures of the 
two foods to be tasted and formed an impression of them: A sundae of Häagen-Dazs ice 
cream and a package of Leibniz butter biscuits. While the biscuits were relatively 
attractive, the ice-cream was more desirable (see footnote 6, p. 31). 
Participants proceeded with the cognitive load manipulation, which was 
introduced as a means to discover how concentration affects food evaluation. In the high 
load condition, participants had to remember a difficult 8-digit number (“84734239”). 
In the low load condition, participants had to remember an easy 8-digit number 
(“11111111”). 
Next, participants were informed that for randomization purposes the products 
would be simultaneously assigned to both of them by the computer. The assignment 
was then shown to them in a slot-machine-like animation, in which they saw their own 
outcome and the outcome of their experimental partner at the same time on their 
individual computer screens. In two thirds of the participant pairs, one participant was 
assigned to the biscuits and his or her experimental partner was assigned to the ice 
cream. This resulted in two experimental conditions: Participants who were assigned to 
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the biscuits (and their experimental partner to the ice cream) were in the better-off 
neighbor condition. Participants who were assigned to the ice cream (and their 
experimental partner to the biscuits) were in the worse-off-neighbor condition. In 
another third of the participant pairs, both experimental partners were assigned to taste 
both the ice cream and the biscuits. In this third condition—the equal-neighbor 
condition—only the order of the taste tests of the two products varied among the two 
experimental partners, one tasting the biscuits first and then the ice-cream and the other 
one tasting the ice cream first and then the biscuits.7 
Then, participants were told that their preferences are another factor that affects 
product evaluation and that they should think about how they valued both products and 
whether they preferred one of the presented products. To assess their envy, participants 
were then asked to indicate, how strongly they envied their experimental partner on a 
scale ranging from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“very much”). After that, they were asked how 
much they would be willing to pay for the ice cream and for the biscuits. Before tasting 
the food(s), participants wrote down the 8-digit number they had to remember. In the 
taste judgment, they indicated on a 7-point scale how the food tasted (1 = very bad, 7 = 
very good). At the end, they were thanked and paid. 
                                                 
7
 Given that the order in which participants were going to taste the two products in this condition did not 
affect any of the dependent variables in main effects, nor in interactions with cognitive load (Fs < 2.16, 
Ps > .15), further analyses are collapsed over both groups. 
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Figure 2. Mean envy towards the neighboring participant on a scale from 1 (not at all) 
to 7 (very much) as a function of neighbor and cognitive load conditions (Experiment 
2). Error bars represent one standard error (n = 18 to 22 per experimental condition). 
Results 
Envy 
Inspection of the means in Figure 2 reveals that participants’ envy was indeed 
affected by their and their neighbor’s outcome and the cognitive load that was imposed 
on them. Specifically, the descriptively highest envy was reported by participants under 
high cognitive load in the better-off neighbor condition (M = 3.53, SD = 1.98). In 
comparison, high cognitive load participants in the equal-neighbor condition (M = 1.73, 
SD = 1.08) and the worse-off-neighbor condition (M = 1.72, SD = .96) expressed less 
envy. Low cognitive load participants expressed similar (low) amounts of envy in the 
better-off neighbor condition (M = 2.28, SD = 1.84) as well as in the equal (M = 2.10, 
SD = 1.41), and worse-off neighbor (M = 1.32, SD = .75) conditions.  
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The data was analyzed in a 3 (neighbor: better-off vs. equal vs. worse-off) × 2 
(cognitive load: high vs. low) analysis of variance (ANOVA). The reported means 
corresponded to a significant two-way interaction, F(2, 110) = 3.28, p = .04, which 
qualified a neighbor condition main effect F(2, 110) = 9.59, p = 10-5 and a trend of a 
cognitive load main effect, F(2, 110) = 2.68, p = .10. Planned contrasts confirmed that 
within the high cognitive load condition, more envy was reported by participants in the 
better-off neighbor condition than by participants in the equal or worse-off-neighbor 
conditions, F(1, 110) = 21.20, p = 10-4. Also, participants in the better-off neighbor 
condition expressed more envy when being under high cognitive load compared to those 
under low cognitive load F(1, 110) = 7.33, p = .008. 
Willingness to Pay 
As shown in Figure 3, participants’ willingness to pay for the inferior (butter 
biscuits) and superior food (ice cream) also conformed to the predictions. Corroborating 
the different desirability of the foods, participants were willing to pay more money for 
the superior food (M = 2.68 Euro, SD = 3.94) than for the inferior food (M = .71 Euro, 
SD = .86).  
As expected, participants having a better-off neighbor while being under high 
cognitive load expressed the highest willingness to pay for the ice cream (M = 5.06 
Euro, SD = 7.71). In comparison, high load participants with an equal neighbor 
(M = 2.38 Euro, SD = 2.90) or a worse-off neighbor (M = 1.84 Euro, SD = 1.07) were 
willing to pay less. In contrast, descriptively, low load participants were willing to pay 
somewhat less for the ice cream in the better-off neighbor condition (M = 1.67 Euro, 
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SD = 1.04) than in the equal (M = 2.50 Euro, SD = 3.07) or worse-off neighbor 
(M = 2.65 Euro, SD = 3.16) conditions. 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean willingness to pay (in Euro) for the inferior food and the superior food 
as a function of neighbor and cognitive load conditions (Experiment 2). Error bars 
represent one standard error (n = 18 to 22 per between subjects condition).  
Willingness to pay for the inferior food was higher in the high cognitive load 
condition (M = .85 Euro, SD = 1.12) than in the low cognitive load condition (M = .58, 
Euro, SD = .42). Apart from that, willingness to pay for the inferior food was similar 
across experimental conditions (high load condition: Mbetter-off neighbor = .84 Euro, SD = 
1.10; Mequal neighbor = .85 Euro, SD = 1.02; Mworse-off neighbor = .85 Euro, SD = 1.31; low 
load condition: Mbetter-off neighbor = .54 Euro, SD = .46; Mequal neighbor = .62 Euro, SD = .49; 
Mworse-off neigbhor = .56 Euro, SD = .28). 
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This pattern produced a significant three-way interaction in a 3 (neighbor: better-
off vs. equal vs. worse-off) × 2 (cognitive load: high vs. low) × 2 (food: inferior vs. 
superior) repeated measures ANOVA, F(2, 110) = 3.49, p = .03. In addition, the lower 
order neighbor × load interaction was marginally significant F(2, 110) = 2.67, p = .07, 
and their was a main effect of food, F(1, 110) = 33.21, p = 10-7 (all other effects 
F < 1.92, ps > .17). 
Contrast analyses confirmed that under high load, participants reported a higher 
willingness to pay for the superior food in the better-off neighbor condition compared to 
the other neighbor conditions, F(1, 110) = 7.46, p = .01. Under low load, the 
descriptively reduced willingness to pay for the superior food in the better-off neighbor 
condition as compared to the other neighbor conditions did not approach statistical 
significance, F(1, 110) = .68, p = .41. Comparing the cognitive load conditions within 
the better-off neighbor condition, high load participants reported a higher willingness to 
pay for the superior food than low load participants F(1, 110) = 7.11, p = .01. Apart 
from a marginal load effect on the willingness to pay for the inferior food, F(1, 110) = 
2.82, p = .10, it was not affected by the experimental manipulations (Fs < 1). 
Mediation Analysis 
To examine whether the joint effect of the presence of a better-off neighbor and 
high cognitive load on the amount of money participants were willing to pay for the 
superior food was statistically mediated by the experience of envy, I conducted a 
mediated moderation analysis following the guidelines of Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt 
(2005; see also R. M. Baron & Kenny, 1986; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). 
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For the analysis, experimental conditions were contrast coded. In order to 
compare the better-off neighbor condition to the worse-off-neighbor condition and the 
equal-neighbor condition, the first was coded with the value 2 and the other two with 
the value -1. Cognitive load conditions were coded with the value 1 for high load and 
the value -1 for low load. 
The mediated moderation analysis entailed three regression equations. In the 
first equation (the mediator model), neighbor, load, and the neighbor × load interaction 
were regressed on the experienced envy (the mediator). This revealed a significant main 
effect of neighbor condition, β = .39, t(112) = 4.21, p = 10-4, no effect of load, t(112) = 
1.61, p = .11, and a significant neighbor × load interaction, β = .21, t(112) = 2.22, p = 
.03. In the second equation (the simple dependent variable model), neighbor condition, 
load, and the neighbor × load interaction were regressed on the willingness to pay. This 
revealed only a significant effect of the neighbor × load interaction β = .23, t(112) = 
2.51, p = .01 (main effects |ts| < 1.32, ps > .19). 
In the third equation (the full dependent variable model), neighbor condition, 
cognitive load, and the neighbor × load interaction were again regressed on the 
willingness to pay, however this time the experienced envy (the mediator) and an envy 
× load interaction were added as predictors. This equation produced only a significant 
effect of envy, β = .28, t(110) = 2.82, p = .01. The envy × load interaction was not 
significant, t(110) < 1.22, p = .22. Importantly, the effect of the neighbor × load 
interaction was reduced and rendered non-significant, β = .13, t(110) = 1.38, p = .17; 
main effects |ts| < .59, ps > .56. 
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These results indicate that experienced envy mediated the joint effect of a better-
off neighbor and high cognitive load on the willingness to pay for the superior product. 
The first equation revealed that cognitive load moderated the effect of the neighbor on 
envy. Envy, in turn, predicted the willingness to pay for the superior product (third 
equation), reducing the joint effects of neighbor and load (compared to the second 
equation). This effect of envy on willingness to pay was not moderated by cognitive 
load. To elucidate these findings, I computed the conditional indirect effects at both 
high and low cognitive load. Envy mediated the effect of the neighbor conditions under 
high cognitive load (Z = 2.38, p = .02), but not under low cognitive load (Z = .77, p = 
.44). 
Taste Judgments 
For exploratory reasons, the taste judgments were analyzed as well. Of 
theoretical interest in the present context are the judgments about the inferior biscuits, 
which were tasted by participants in the better-off neighbor condition and the equal-
neighbor condition. In the high load condition, better-off neighbor participants 
perceived the inferior biscuits to taste better (M = 5.53, SD = 1.68) than in the equal 
neighbor condition (M = 4.95, SD = 1.11). In the low load condition, this was also the 
case (Mbetter-off neighbor = 5.44, SD = 1.15; Mequal neighbor = 4.90, SD = 1.33). This pattern 
resulted in a marginal neighbor condition main effect in a 2 (neighbor: better-off vs. 
equal) × 2 (cognitive load: high vs. low) ANOVA F(1, 75) = 3.18, p = .08. No other 
effects approached significance, Fs < 1, ps > .76. 
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Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 support the hypothesis that envy and the desire for 
another’s superior possession is particularly likely if mental capacity is taxed. Strongest 
envy was expressed by those participants in the high cognitive load condition who were 
assigned to taste the inferior biscuits while their neighbor was about to taste the superior 
ice cream. In line with the prediction that people who have the mental capacity to exert 
self-control at their disposal, participants in the low cognitive load condition did not 
report elevated levels of envy towards the better-off other. 
Parallel results were obtained for the amount of money participants were willing 
to pay for the superior food. High cognitive load participants with a better-off neighbor 
reported the highest willingness to pay for the ice cream compared to participants who 
had a neighbor with an equal or worse outcome. In contrast, low load participants facing 
a superior other were not willing to pay more for the ice cream than participants who 
had a neighbor with an equal or worse outcome. Descriptively, they seemed to be 
willing to pay less for the superior ice cream when a better-off neighbor was present 
than in the other neighbor conditions. While in accord with the “sour grapes” 
hypothesis, according to which participants might rationalize their inferior outcome by 
disparaging the superior stimulus, this difference did not approach statistical 
significance.  
Willingness to pay for the inferior food, the biscuits, was not affected by the 
neighbor conditions neither under high nor under low load, showing a) that the effect of 
the better-off neighbor in the high cognitive load condition was specific to the superior 
product and b) that there was no sign of a “sweet lemon” effect, which would imply an 
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increased willingness to pay for the inferior food in the low load condition. The absence 
of both the “sweet lemon” and “sour grapes” effect in the willingness to pay measure 
might be due to its insufficient sensitivity. Of course, participants might also have used 
other coping strategies than these particular forms of rationalization. 
Unexpectedly, there was a trend towards a higher willingness to pay for the 
inferior product under high load. Possibly, this was an unintended side effect of the 
different numbers used in the cognitive load conditions. In the high load condition, the 
number and its digits (“84734239”) were higher than in the low load condition 
(“11111111”). Thus, the higher willingness to pay in this condition might be due to an 
anchoring effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). However, given that participants’ 
willingness to pay for the inferior product was affected uniformly by load in the 
different neighbor conditions, this effect does not offer an alternative explanation for the 
interactive effects of neighbor and load conditions on the willingness to pay for the 
superior product. 
Substantiating the view that the higher willingness to pay of high load 
participants in the better-off neighbor condition was caused by the intensity of their 
envious reaction, reported envy mediated the effect of the neighbor conditions on the 
willingness to pay under high cognitive load. Furthermore, the correlational evidence of 
the mediated moderation analysis suggests a particular way in which the load 
manipulation affected the impact of envy on willingness to pay. Cognitive load 
moderated the effect of the neighbor conditions on envy, but did not moderate the effect 
of envy on the willingness to pay for the superior food of the neighbor. In other words, 
envy was stronger under high than under low cognitive load. Higher envy was then 
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related to a higher willingness to pay for the envied good. This relation was not affected 
by the load manipulation. 
In participants’ taste judgments of the inferior biscuits, there was a marginal 
effect towards a higher evaluation reported by those participants who faced a better-off 
other as compared with those who faced an equally endowed other. This result is in line 
with a “sweet lemons” rationalization strategy in response to being deprived of a desired 
good, in which the evaluation of the inferior good is raised. This effect was not 
moderated by the load manipulation. This could be due to the fact that the taste 
judgments were performed after the cognitive load manipulation was lifted (which was 
done intentionally to keep the cognitive load phase of the experiment as short as 
possible). However, the difference in evaluation between the neighbor conditions may 
have also been caused by a contrast effect within the equal neighbor condition, whose 
participants tasted both the desirable ice cream and the less desirable biscuits. 
In sum, the results of Experiment 2 lend credence to the interpretation that taxed 
mental resources influenced participants’ judgment by impairing their capability to 
control and alter their emotional reaction. However, for the main findings, two 
alternative interpretations remain. First, it also seems possible that the cognitive load 
manipulation merely affected the expression of envy. For example, participants in the 
high load condition might have lacked the resources to assess the normativity of their 
answer on the envy item and thus not refrained from admitting their envy. Second, one 
could assume that the expression of envy itself caused the higher willingness to pay for 
the superior product. Participants might have inferred their valuation of the superior 
product from their answer to the envy item (Bem, 1972). Given that all participants 
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were asked to report how strongly the envied their neighbor prior to indicating their 
willingness to pay, this interpretation cannot be ruled out on the basis of Experiment 2’s 
data. Another limitation of Experiment 2 is that participants’ inclination to acquire the 
superior good was solely assessed hypothetically. 
The following experiments address these issues by measuring spontaneous 
purchasing behavior (Exp. 3) and employing an implicit measure of participants’ 
impulsive approach behavior towards the superior good (Exp. 4) without preceding 
envy measures. 
Experiment 3 
Participants of Experiment 2 expressed more envy and a higher proclivity to 
acquire the superior food that was not assigned to them but to their experimental partner 
when experiencing high cognitive load. To provide direct evidence for the effects of 
envy on the likelihood to purchase the envied good, Experiment 3 tested whether an 
envy provoking situation would affect actual, spontaneous buying behavior. 
Following up on the previous study, in Experiment 3, all participants were put 
under high cognitive load. Again, in the crucial experimental condition, participants 
experienced a better-off neighbor. In this Experiment, this condition was compared to a 
no-neighbor condition (as in Experiment 1). Participants in the better-off neighbor 
condition were assigned to taste an undesirable sauerkraut juice, while their neighbor (a 
confederate) was assigned to taste a more desirable fruit smoothie. Participants in the 
no-neighbor condition were also assigned to taste the sauerkraut juice (and were 
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deprived of the smoothie) but were alone. After the assignment procedure, all 
participants were given the opportunity to purchase the superior food. 
I expected that those participants who were assigned to the inferior product in 
the presence of a better-off other would be more likely to spontaneously purchase the 
superior product than those who participated alone. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Participants were 53 adults (46 female, 7 male; age 19 to 34) who had been 
recruited at a campus of the University of Cologne. All of them were given the high 
cognitive load task (see Experiment 2). About half of them were assigned to a better-off 
neighbor condition; the other half was assigned to a no-neighbor condition. They 
participated in exchange for a 10% chance to win 10 Euro in a lottery. 
Procedure 
Experimental set up and initial procedure were identical to Experiment 2. 
However, a different pair of foods was presented. The less desirable food was a carton 
of sauerkraut juice (Alnatura Sauerkrautsaft, a fermented cabbage juice), the more 
desirable food was a bottle of brand fruit smoothie (True Fruits Smoothie, see footnote 
6, p. 31). After forming an impression of the foods, participants proceeded with the 
cognitive load task as in Experiment 2. However in this experiment, all participants 
were asked to remember the difficult 8-digit number (i.e., high cognitive load 
condition). Then, the food was assigned with the same explanation and the same slot-
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machine-like animation as in Experiment 2, but implementing the experimental 
conditions of Experiment 1. In the better-off neighbor condition, the computer 
ostensibly assigned the sauerkraut juice to the participant and assigned the smoothie to a 
confederate – who pretended to be another participant. In the no-neighbor condition, the 
computer also ostensibly assigned the sauerkraut juice (and not the smoothie) to the 
participant, but no other participant was present. In this condition, the research assistant 
who acted as a confederate in the other condition was in the room too, but revealed 
being part of the research team by telling the experimenter that he or she was using the 
computer to enter data. 
After the computer had assigned the food, the participant was led to a second 
experimenter in another room to complete the taste test (in the condition with the 
confederate, he or she was led to a third room). This was done to ensure that the second 
experimenter was blind to the condition of the participant. After having introduced him- 
or herself, the experimenter remarked that too many smoothies had been bought 
accidentally and offered the participant to purchase a smoothie “at cost price for 1.30 
Euro instead of 2.30 Euro” (for a similar procedure see Xu & Wyer, 2008, Exp. 4). 
Then, the participant wrote down the 8-digit number and proceeded with the taste test. 
During the taste test, they indicated on 9-point scales, how good the juice tasted (1 = 
very bad, 9 = very good) and to what extent the juice was delicious, aromatic, and 
refreshing (1 = not at all, 9 = very much). The four items were internally consistent, 
Cronbach’s α = .74, and thus averaged to a taste evaluation score. At the end, every 
participant was given a 10% chance to win 10 Euro in a lottery. 
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Results 
I predicted that participants (whose mental resources were taxed) would be more 
likely to spontaneously purchase a superior food if they were aware of a neighbor who 
was better off because he was assigned to taste the superior food. The results are indeed 
consistent with this prediction. Given the opportunity, 12 out of 25 participants (48.0 %) 
with a better-off neighbor bought the smoothie. In contrast, only 6 out of 28 participants 
(21.4 %) who participated alone bought the smoothie. The frequency difference 
between the conditions was significant, χ2(1, N = 53) = 4.16, p = .04. 
Interestingly, participants in the better-off neighbor condition judged the 
sauerkraut juice to taste better (M = 4.25, SD = 1.99) than participants who did not face 
a better-off other during the assignment procedure (M = 3.21, SD = 1.44), t(51) = 2.20, 
p = .03. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 3 replicate the findings of Experiment 2 by showing 
that cognitively taxed participants were more inclined to buy an attractive food they 
were deprived off if a neighbor had been endowed with this superior good. Furthermore, 
the results of Experiment 2 were extended by demonstrating that the envy provoking 
situation affected actual purchasing behavior. Given that participants could purchase the 
smoothie directly after the assignment procedure, without in-between self-report about 
their envy, the findings corroborate the hypothesis that uncontrolled envy entails an 
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impulse to strive for the envied good, regardless whether people are pointed to their 
envy or not. 
Another result of Experiment 3 is that participants evaluated the taste of the 
sauerkraut juice more positively when having been assigned to taste it in the presence of 
a better-off other than when participating alone. This finding supports the notion that a 
way to cope with the negative emotional consequences of an envy-evoking situation is 
to rationalize one’s outcome by increasing its value, resulting in a “sweet lemon” effect. 
Participants may have done so because during the taste test the cognitive load 
instruction was already lifted. Participants in the no-neighbors condition were also 
deprived of the superior smoothie and they might have rationalized their outcome too. 
However, since their emotional experience can be assumed to have been less intense, 
they should be less motivated to exert emotional self-control. 
An advantage of this experiment is that participants’ proclivity to buy the 
superior good was assessed in a more subtle way: The opportunity to purchase the 
smoothie was seemingly unrelated to the purpose of the “taste study”, and thus not 
readily apparent as measure used by the experimenters. However, this experiment did 
not include a condition without cognitive load. Hence, the question remains whether the 
null effect found for better-off neighbor/low load participants in Experiment 2 was due 
to the fact that their inclination to obtain the superior good was measured blatantly by 
the self-report willingness to pay item. As discussed before, this item might have been 
susceptible to social desirability concerns. Thus, participants in Experiment 2’s better-
off neighbor/low load condition might have felt the same desire for the superior product 
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but might have refrained from expressing their desire. Experiment 4 addresses this issue 
by using an implicit measure of the participant’s approach tendency. 
Experiment 4 
The results of Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that envy heightens participants’ 
desire for the superior good of their neighbor by showing an increased inclination to 
acquire this good under conditions of taxed capacity to exert self-control. Extending 
these findings, Experiment 4 sought to trace the impulsive behavioral consequences of 
envious longing. 
To this end, I used an implicit measure (for a recent review, see Petty, Fazio, & 
Briñol, 2008) of participants’ automatic tendency to approach vs. avoid the envied 
good. The experimental paradigm was similar to the one used by Chen and Bargh 
(1999; see also Seibt, Häfner, & Deutsch, 2007). Participants had to respond as quickly 
as possible to pictorial stimuli by pushing or pulling a joystick. As the task was framed 
in a way that pulling the joystick towards oneself was associated with an approach 
movement and pushing the joystick away was associated with an avoidance movement, 
participants’ behavioral approach tendency towards the stimuli can be inferred from 
their reaction times (Seibt, Neumann, Nussinson, & Strack, 2008; see also Eder & 
Rothermund, 2008; Markman & Brendl, 2005). Approach-avoidance measures like the 
one used in this study can be assumed to reflect the impulsive behavioral readiness to 
approach stimuli, triggered by immediate evaluations upon their encounter (Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004). Previous research has shown that measurement procedures based on 
approach and avoidance movements are sensitive to interindividual motivational 
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differences, such as variation in sexual desire (Hofmann, Friese, & Gschwendner, 
2009), and to differences in need states, such as the desire for food evoked by hunger 
(Seibt et al., 2007), or the attraction to erotic stimuli caused by sexual abstinence (Seibt, 
Häfner, Strack, & Deutsch, 2008). 
Participants were assigned to high and low load conditions. As in Experiment 3, 
participants were deprived of a more attractive food either in the presence or without the 
presence of a better-off neighbor. Subsequently, participants completed the approach-
avoidance task, in which they responded to pictures of the superior food, the inferior 
food, and neutral objects by pushing or pulling a joystick. Given that participants’ task, 
namely to classify the pictures according to their position of the screen, was unrelated to 
the stimuli, and because they had to respond as quickly as possible within a narrow time 
window, reaction times can be assumed to reflect automatic behavioral inclinations, 
which are unlikely to be affected by concerns about the social desirability of the 
responses (Petty et al., 2008). 
I predicted hat under high load, the envy evoking situation results in an 
impulsive approach tendency towards the superior food. Under low load this should not 
occur, given that participants in this condition have the cognitive capacity to control 
their emotional response at their disposal. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Participants were 96 (53 female, 43 male; age 18 to 59) visitors of the main 
cafeteria of the University of Cologne. They were assigned to a 2 (neighbor: better-off 
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vs. none) × 2 (cognitive load: high vs. low) × 3 (stimulus: superior food vs. inferior food 
vs. neutral) × 2 (response: approach vs. avoidance) mixed-factorial design8, with the 
first two factors manipulated between participants and the latter two factors manipulated 
within participants. Participants received 4 Euro as compensation. 
Procedure 
After the initial instructions, which were identical to Experiments 2 and 3, 
participants were introduced to the approach-avoidance task, which was referred to as 
“a reaction time task.” They were told that they would first complete a practice block of 
the task, proceed with other tasks, and then complete the reaction time task again. 
Participants were instructed to push or to pull the lever of a joystick in response 
to pictorial stimuli presented on a computer screen (the procedure was similar to the one 
used by Seibt, Häfner, & Deutsch, 2007, Exp. 3). The required response (pushing vs. 
pulling) depended on the vertical position in which the stimuli appeared. For example, 
when a stimulus appeared on the upper half of the screen, participants had to pull the 
lever of the joystick. In contrast, when a stimulus appeared on the lower half of the 
screen, participants had to push the lever of the joystick. The assignment of push vs. 
pull movements to stimuli appearing on the upper vs. the lower half of the screen was 
counterbalanced across participants. To enhance the association of pulling the joystick 
                                                 
8
 Additionally, it was counterbalanced between participants whether stimuli appearing on the top (or 
bottom) of the screen had to be responded to with an approach (or avoidance) movement. As this 
methodological factor did not alter the predicted neighbor × load × stimulus interaction, F(2, 176) = 1.05, 
p = .35, further analyses are collapsed over both combinations. 
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with an approach movement and of pushing the joystick with an avoidance movement, 
participants were asked to “pull the appearing objects towards you” and “push the 
appearing objects away from you” using the joystick (Seibt et al., 2008). Furthermore, 
following participants’ response, a decrease in distance for pulled objects and an 
increase in distance for pushed objects were simulated by gradually increasing or 
decreasing the size of the stimuli by 44% in an animation that lasted 270 ms (for a 
similar procedure see Wentura, Rothermund, & Bak, 2000, Exp. 3). Both speed and 
accuracy of responses were emphasized. To prompt spontaneous reactions, a response 
window of 300 ms to 1,300 ms was employed. In case, participants underran the 
response window, they were reminded to wait for the stimulus. In case participants 
overran the response window, they were reminded to respond faster. If participants 
moved the joystick in the wrong direction, they received an error message. Interstimulus 
interval (with blank screen) was 2,500 ms. 
In the practice block, participants responded to 8 neutral pictures (see 
Appendix). Each stimulus was presented twice on the upper half of the screen and twice 
on the lower half of the screen, totaling 32 randomly ordered trials. 
After the practice block, the two foods were shown to the participants. As in 
Experiment 3, the foods were a fruit smoothie (True Fruits smoothie) and sauerkraut 
juice (Alnatura Sauerkrautsaft, see footnote 6, p. 31). 
Then, participants received the cognitive load manipulation, which was identical 
to the one used in Experiment 2. Participants in the high load condition had to 
remember a difficult 8-digit number, whereas participants in the low load condition had 
to remember an easy 8-digit number. 
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Next, the foods were assigned using the same procedure as in Experiment 3. 
Participants in the better-off neighbor condition were assigned to the sauerkraut juice, 
while their experimental partner (a confederate) was assigned to the smoothie. 
Participants in the no-neighbor condition were assigned to the sauerkraut juice (and not 
the smoothie), without an experimental partner being present. 
Then, participants completed the four target blocks of the approach vs. 
avoidance task. Within each block, a picture of the sauerkraut juice and a picture of the 
smoothie were presented twice on the upper half and twice on the lower half of the 
screen. Additionally, pictures of four neutral objects (see Appendix) were presented 
once on the upper and once on the lower half of the screen, totaling 16 randomly 
ordered trials per block. 
Before tasting the sauerkraut juice, participants wrote down the 8-digit number. 
Taste judgments were provided on the same items as in Experiment 3, which were 
averaged into a taste evaluation score (Cronbach’s α = .72). Finally, participants were 
thanked and paid. 
Results 
The analysis is based on the four target blocks of the approach-avoidance task. 
All error trials were discarded (2.0 % of the data), along with all reaction times outside 
of the response window of 300 ms to 1,300 ms (3.1 % of the data). Mean response 
latencies were computed separately for approach and avoidance trials within each 
stimulus category. For ease of presentation, the mean reaction time for approach trials 
was then subtracted from the mean reaction time of avoidance trials for each stimulus 
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category. The resulting difference scores reflect the approach tendency toward the 
stimuli. The faster participants were in approaching the stimuli compared to avoiding 
the stimuli, the higher the score. 
I expected that under high cognitive load, participants with a better-off neighbor 
display stronger approach tendencies towards the superior food than those without a 
better-off neighbor. In contrast, under low cognitive load, this should not occur. 
As revealed by the means depicted in Figure 4, the data supports these 
predictions. Descriptively, in the high load condition, the highest approach tendency 
towards the superior food was shown by participants with a better-off neighbor 
(M = 48.03 ms, SD = 39.50) in contrast to the lower approach values towards the 
inferior food (M = 2.08 ms, SD = 100.23) and neutral stimuli (M = 11.24 ms, 
SD = 40.42) in this condition. Conversely, the means did not differ much in the high 
load/no-neighbor condition (Msuperior = 12.39 ms, SD = 59.14; Minferior = 10.84 ms, 
SD = 101.06; Mneutral = 28.98 ms, SD = 57.83). As opposed to the pattern of means in 
the better-off neighbor/high load condition, participants in the low load condition who 
had a better-off neighbor approached the superior food (M = 12.73 ms, SD = 67.89) less 
than the inferior food (M = 36.44 ms, SD = 63.78) and neutral stimuli (M = 35.86 ms, 
SD = 40.24). Again, this difference was not present in the low load/no-neighbor 
condition (Msuperior = 48.78 ms, SD = 93.46; Minferior = 41.32 ms, SD = 73.37; Mneutral = 
39.11 ms, SD = 57.36). 
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Figure 4. Mean approach tendency in ms (reaction time of approach movements 
subtracted from reaction time of avoidance movements) towards the inferior food, 
towards the superior food, and towards neutral objects as a function of neighbor 
condition and cognitive load (Experiment 4). Error bars represent one standard error (n 
= 23 to 25 per between subjects condition).  
The mean approach tendency scores were submitted to a 2 (neighbor: better-off 
vs. none) × 2 (cognitive load: high vs. low) × 3 (stimulus: smoothie vs. sauerkraut juice 
vs. neutral) repeated measures ANOVA. The analysis revealed a significant three-way 
interaction, F(1.90, 170.68) = 7.11, p = .03, which qualified a marginal load main effect, 
F(1, 92) = 2.89, p = .09) due to the overall higher approach tendency in the low load 
condition (M = 35.71, SD = 49.31) than in the high load condition (M = 18.93, SD = 
46.77). No other main effects or lower order interactions were significant, Fs < 1.63, ps 
> .20. 
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To further analyze the data, planned contrasts were computed within the 
experimental conditions. High load/better-off neighbor participants approached the 
superior food more than the other stimuli, F(1, 22) = 7.48, p = .01. Conversely, low 
load/better-off neighbor participants tended to approach the superior food less than the 
other stimuli, F(1, 24) = 3.03, p = .09. Neither of the effects emerged when participants 
were alone (Fs < 1). Analyzing only the responses towards the superior food, high load 
participants approached it more when next to a better-off neighbor than when being 
alone, F(1, 92) = 3.12, p = .08. Under low load, the opposite occurred F(1, 92) = 3.46, p 
= .07. 
Participants’ taste judgments about the sauerkraut juice were also affected by the 
experimental manipulations. Particularly, in the high load condition, participants facing 
a better-off neighbor liked the taste of the sauerkraut juice descriptively less (M = 3.52, 
SD = 2.05) when facing a better-off other than when being alone (M = 4.21, SD = 1.23). 
In contrast, in the low load condition, participants facing a better-off neighbor liked the 
taste of the sauerkraut juice descriptively more (M = 4.61, SD = 1.65) when facing a 
better-off other than when being alone (M = 3.95, SD = 1.89). This pattern resulted in a 
marginally significant interaction effect in a 2 (neighbor: better-off vs. none) × 2 
(cognitive load: high vs. low) ANOVA, F(1, 92) = 3.58, p = .06. No other effects 
emerged, Fs < 1.37, ps > .25. The single contrast comparing the neighbor conditions 
within the high load condition was not significant, F(1, 92) = 1.78, p = .19, neither was 
the single contrast within the low load conditions, F(1, 92) = 1.90, p = .18. 
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Discussion 
The goal of Experiment 4 was to show that when participants’ capacity to exert 
self control is constrained, an envy provoking situation results in an impulsive 
behavioral tendency to approach the envied good. In line with this prediction, 
participants in the high load condition had a stronger automatic approach tendency 
towards the superior food they had been deprived off, only when sitting next to a better-
off neighbor. In contrast, this effect did not occur when they were alone.  
Interestingly, in the low load condition, participants tended to approach the 
superior food less when a better-off neighbor was present, in line with the view that 
“sour grapes” can result from an envy-evoking situation. For participants in this 
condition, coping with their envy may have led to a negative evaluation of the superior 
food, resulting in less automatic approach behavior. 
Some readers might be surprised by these findings, especially because implicit 
attitudes are sometimes considered to be relatively stable and difficult to change (e.g., 
Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). However, there is 
evidence supporting the notion that impulsive responding can be flexible. Such effects 
have been predominantly demonstrated in the domain of stereotyping and prejudice 
(Blair, 2002). For example, situational motivations of individuals can alter the automatic 
operation of stereotypes and prejudice (Sinclair & Kunda, 1999; Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, 
Fong, & Duinn, 1998). Also, reflective processes can alter the accessibility of contents 
within the impulsive system (Strack, Werth, & Deutsch, 2006; see also Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006). For example, counterstereotypic mental imagery attenuated 
automatic stereotyping in a study by Blair, Ma, and Lenton (2001). Similarly, focusing 
Experiment 4   63 
 
on information unrelated to a stereotype can reduce automatic stereotypic responding 
(Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Ford, 1997). Thus, the impulsive orientation towards 
a stimulus may be influenced by how the stimulus is construed in a given situation and 
can thus be susceptible to emotional reappraisal strategies. 
Unexpectedly, there was a tendency to approach all stimuli more in the low load 
condition than in the high load condition. One might speculate that the difficult dual 
task completion was a somewhat aversive experience for participants in the high load 
condition, which might have led to a decreased approach focus in general. However, 
given that I predicted differential effects within the load conditions, this result is 
extraneous to the hypotheses. 
Participants’ evaluations of the taste of sauerkraut juice, the inferior food they 
were assigned to, seemed to be in line with a “sweet lemons” rationalization strategy 
only, when they were not taxed by cognitive load. In this condition, participants judged 
the sauerkraut juice to taste better when facing a better-off neighbor than when being 
alone, as compared to the high load condition in which the opposite pattern emerged. 
However, it has to be noted that the statistical support for this effect is weak. 
Nevertheless, these tentative results are at odds with the findings from Experiment 2, in 
which participants taste judgments were not affected by the load manipulation. The 
results are also inconsistent with Experiment 3, in which there was a “sweet lemons” 
effect for better-off neighbor participants despite the high cognitive load they were 
subjected to. Procedural differences may be responsible for this discrepancy. While the 
taste judgments of all three experiments were carried out after the load manipulation 
was lifted, its duration and the concurrent tasks differed. While the load manipulation in 
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Experiments 2 and 3 had to be followed for a short time only and was accompanied by 
relatively easy tasks, in Experiment 4, the load task had to be followed carried in 
parallel to the longer and more demanding approach-avoidance task. In combination, 
the two tasks may have depleted self-regulatory resources (Baumeister et al., 1998) that 
would have been needed to cognitively “sweeten the lemon” during the subsequent taste 
test. 
General Discussion   65 
 
General Discussion 
In the present thesis, I explore the preconditions and the consequences of 
envious desire – an experience that appears to be a universal outcome of the human 
condition and to convey vast interpersonal, societal, and economic implications 
(Aristotle, trans. 1929; Belk, 2008; Foster, 1972; De la Mora, 1987; Douglas & 
Isherwood, 1979; Frank, 2000; Girard, 1979, 2001; Schoeck, 1971). Based on social 
comparison research (Festinger, 1954; Gilbert et al., 1995; Suls & Wheeler, 2000;), 
evolutionary psychology (Hill & Buss, 2006, 2008), a dual process perspective on 
psychological functioning (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004), and research on self-control 
(Baumeister & Vohs, 2004; Gross, 2006), I argue that when becoming aware of 
someone possessing a superior good, spontaneous social comparisons automatically 
evoke envious discontent and an impulsive striving for this good. However, given that 
expressing envy violates social norms, and because experiencing envy is both painful 
and detrimental to the positive self-views that people try to maintain, people should be 
motivated to control their emotional reaction. Thus, the consequences of an envy-
evoking situation should be evident only when people’s capacity to exert self-control is 
taxed. 
In four experiments, envy was elicited by depriving participants of a somewhat 
more desirable food, while facing another participant (or confederate) who was asked to 
taste this food. Experiment 1 provided support for the hypothesis that envious 
discontent is particularly strong among participants with constrained self-control. The 
greater participants’ alcohol intoxication, the more dissatisfied, angry, and envious they 
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were in response to not receiving the chocolate, which was superior to their simple 
candy. As predicted, this happened only when they were in the presence of a better-off 
other, but not when they were alone. Participants of Experiment 2, who received butter 
biscuits and not the more desirable ice cream sundae, were more envious towards their 
better-off neighbor and willing to pay more for the superior good, only, if their 
cognitive capacity was taxed by high cognitive load. Additionally, experienced envy 
mediated the effect of the envy-evoking situation on participants’ willingness to pay for 
the more desirable good. Under identical conditions, Experiment 3’s participants, who 
were asked to taste sauerkraut juice and not the more desirable fruit smoothie of their 
neighbor, were more inclined to spontaneously purchase the superior drink than 
participants who were deprived of the smoothie, too, but did not face a better-off other. 
Finally, Experiment 4 provided evidence for the impulsive behavioral approach 
tendency that is elicited in this situation. Participants who were taxed by high cognitive 
load while facing a better-off neighbor were faster in approaching the superior stimulus 
in a reaction time-based approach-avoidance measure than those, who participated 
alone. Taken together, these studies provide converging evidence for the notion that 
spontaneous social comparisons result in envious discontent and impulsive longing for 
the superior good of another person if the capacity to control envy is taxed. 
The studies also present some initial evidence on how people cope with envy 
given that they have the self-regulatory resources to do so at their disposal. A common 
coping strategy might be to cognitively change the meaning of the envy-evoking 
stimulus in order to decrease its perceived evaluation, resulting in “sour grapes”. 
Participants in Experiment 4 seemed to have resorted to this strategy, as indicated by 
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their tendency to approach the superior good less, when being in an envy situation 
without additional cognitive load. Participants in some conditions of Experiments 2, 3, 
and 4 also showed signs of the complementary cognitive change strategy “sweet 
lemons”. When tasting their inferior food, they seemed to have raised their evaluation of 
it. The fact that these effects were less powerful and less robust across experiments, 
might reflect that people may use other coping strategies to deal with envy-evoking 
situations. Further research is needed to elaborate these ways to regulate envy in more 
detail. 
Alternative Explanations 
Social Facilitation 
Social facilitation might be perceived to be a potential alternative explanation for 
at least some of the present effects. In his seminal review, Zajonc (1965) observed that 
the presence of other people can increase arousal and causes an increase in the 
likelihood of dominant responses as evidenced by performance in simple as compared 
to complex tasks (Zajonc & Sales, 1966). Several additional mediating mechanisms 
have been proposed. An example is the notion that the mere presence of others is 
distracting and can cause cognitive overload (e.g., R. S. Baron, 1986), resulting in a 
narrowed attentional focus (Huguet, Galvaing, Monteil, & Dumas, 1999). The 
consequences include a greater focus on food and increased food intake (Hetherington, 
Anderson, Norton, & Newson, 2006). 
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As both the frustration about being deprived of a desired good as well as the 
tendency to approach this good can easily be conceived as a dominant response, the 
mere presence of another person might increase their likelihood. This is particularly 
relevant for Experiments 1 and 4 in which participants were either alone (no-neighbor 
condition) or in the presence of a confederate (better-off neighbor condition). However, 
Experiments 2 and 3 speak against such an interpretation. Here, participants in the 
control conditions were not alone. While in Experiment 2, participants in the control 
conditions were not deprived of the superior good, Experiment 3’s control condition is 
directly comparable to those of Experiment 1 and 4 in that respect. However, 
Experiment 3 can rule out a social facilitation account because the number of people in 
the room was constant across conditions. When the inferior food was assigned to the 
participant, the confederate was always present. The difference being that in the no-
neighbor condition, he or she posed as a research assistant. With regard to Experiment 
4, it is also conceivable that the close presence of another person in the better-off 
neighbor condition increased the likelihood of the presumably dominant approach 
response toward the desired smoothie. This might be especially likely in the high 
cognitive load condition, in which the distraction caused by the load manipulation and 
the other person is combined. However, from a social facilitation perspective, one 
would not have predicted the flip of the pattern in the low cognitive load condition. 
Thus, in sum, social facilitation effects cannot explain the set of findings throughout the 
four experiments. 
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Scarcity 
At first glance, it might also seem that there is much overlap of the present 
findings with research on the effects of scarcity on evaluations. Participants in the 
critical conditions of the presented experiments were deprived of the opportunity to 
taste a superior food. According to commodity theory (Brock, 1968), “any commodity 
will be valued to the extent that it is unavailable” (p. 246). That scarcity enhances the 
perceived value of products and opportunities is largely supported by empirical data (for 
a meta-analysis see Lynn, 1991). For example, Worchel, Lee, and Adewole (1975), 
asked participants to rate the attractiveness of cookies in abundant or in scarce supply. 
Cookies in scarce supply were perceived to be more attractive (especially when they 
had been in abundant supply before). Extending these findings, Ditto and Jemmot 
(1989) showed that scarcity information makes negative evaluations more extreme, too. 
Thus, generally, the knowledge that a commodity is scarce can lead to evaluative 
polarization. 
It is reasonable to assume that by making the superior foods unavailable to 
participants, in the present studies, perceptions of scarcity were induced. Even so, more 
discontent and increased desire was evident only in the experimental conditions in 
which another person received the food that was unavailable. In the no-neighbor 
conditions of Experiments 1, 3, and 4, care was taken to ensure that participants 
perceived the likelihood to attain the superior food to be equally high as participants 
with a better-off neighbor. Furthermore, they experienced the same vivid assignment 
procedure. And eventually, they were deprived of the superior food, too. However – in 
contrast to the better-off neighbor condition – they participated alone and were thus not 
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in the immediate presence of another person asked to taste the superior food. Thus, the 
objective scarcity was identical in both experimental conditions. 
Nonetheless, one might argue that the presence of a better-off other made the 
unavailable option even more salient and as a result may have contributed to the 
perceived scarcity of this superior alternative. As I did not measure subjective scarcity 
estimations, I cannot rule out this alternative explanation based on data. Still, I think it is 
unlikely that scarcity drove the effects. The key question is why scarcity should affect 
the desire to attain the superior good primarily when mental capacity is taxed, as found 
in the present research. 
Speculating about the psychological mechanism that causes scarcity effects, 
several researchers have argued that scarcity serves as a heuristic cue (Ditto & Jemmott, 
1989; Cialdini, 1987, 1993). According to this view, information about the prevalence 
of a given commodity is used as a rule of thumb (”rare things are extreme things”) to 
determine its value. Thus, in the case of positive commodities, scarcity should 
automatically lead to increased attractiveness judgments. A straightforward implication 
would be that people whose cognitive capacity is constrained by situational demands 
will react more strongly to scarcity information because they should be more prone to 
resort to heuristic strategies. 
However, opposing the heuristic account of scarcity effects, Brock and Brannon 
(1992) posited that evaluative polarization is mediated by elaborative processing rather 
than by automatic inferences. According to them, scarcity enhances the scrutiny devoted 
to evaluating a commodity and thus leads to more extreme judgments. A convincing 
body of research supports this assertion (Bozzolo & Brock, 1992; Brannon & Brock, 
Alternative Explanations   71 
 
2001a, 2001b; Brock & Mazzocco, 2004). For example, using path analysis, Brannon 
and Brock (2001b, Exp. 1) showed that attitudinal effects of scarcity information were 
mediated by thoughtful processing. Furthermore and most relevant to the interpretation 
of the present studies, scarcity effects were present under low cognitive load, but were 
eliminated in a high cognitive load condition similar to the one used in the present 
research (Brannon & Brock, 2001b, Exp. 2). 
Thus, the present findings are unlikely due to scarcity estimations. Even though 
the experimental procedures may have induced the perception that the superior products 
are scarce commodities, from the scarcity literature one would predict a different pattern 
of results. Because evaluative scarcity effects are mediated by effortful processing, the 
desire for the unattainable food should have been most intense under low cognitive load. 
On the contrary, in the present studies the desire for these products was greatest under 
high cognitive load, supporting the view that (uncontrolled) impulsive striving elicited 
by an envious reaction produced the reported findings. 
Reactance 
Other related findings stem from research on reactance theory (Brehm, 1966; 
Brehm, Stires, Sensenig, & Shaban, 1966;), which deals with unavailable options as 
well, but focuses on the motivational consequences of restricted freedom. According to 
this theoretical perspective, restricting the freedom to engage in a particular behavior 
results in reactance – a “motivational state directed toward restoration of the eliminated 
or threatened freedom” (Brehm et al., 1966, p. 306). If, for example, the freedom to 
choose a specific object is taken away, the desire to attain this object should be 
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amplified. In a classic experiment supporting this hypothesis, Brehm and colleagues 
(1966) asked participants to rate their preference of four attractive records in order to 
freely choose one of them. Later, one of the promised choice alternatives was 
eliminated without a reasonable justification. As predicted by reactance theory, 
participants rated the eliminated choice alternative to be more attractive than in their 
initial preference assessments. 
The experimental procedures used in the present studies have several 
commonalities with the ones employed by Brehm et al. (1966). Specifically, participants 
were presented with two differently attractive foods, and they were deprived of one of 
them. However, reactance theory does not predict that the amplification of 
attractiveness should depend on the presence of a better-off other as found in the present 
studies. Again, one might argue that the presence of the better-off other made the 
unattainable alternative more salient to participants. However, the present findings are 
unlikely to be commensurate with the ones of Brehm et al. (1966) because of a crucial 
difference. In the present studies, the experimental instructions made it very clear from 
the beginning to participants that they would not have the freedom to choose the foods. 
Instead, they assumed that they would be randomly assigned to one of them. In fact, this 
corresponds to the procedure of a control condition used by Brehm et al. (1966, Exp. 2). 
In this condition, participants were also led to believe that they would receive a record. 
However this time, rather than being allowed to freely choose one of them, the record 
they would receive was to be determined by chance. When one of the records was 
eliminated from the set of four promised alternatives, its attractiveness did not increase. 
In contrast to the free choice condition, actually, some signs of decreased attractiveness 
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for the eliminated alternative were present in the random assignment condition (a “sour 
grapes” effect). Hence, it is not a plausible interpretation that the pattern of results in the 
present studies was due to reactance, or that the employed procedures produced a state 
of reactance at all. 
Relation to Previous Research 
Research on Envy 
The present line of research contributes in several ways to the literature on envy. 
First of all, it demonstrates that it is possible and worthwhile to instigate envious 
reactions about goods experimentally. The present results were obtained using a variety 
of envy-evoking objects both in the field as well as in a more controlled laboratory 
environment, and show consistent effects on self-report and behavioral measures. Thus, 
the employed experimental paradigm offers a way to empirically investigate the 
complexities of envy, how an envious episode unfolds in time, and what cognitive, 
affective, and behavioral consequences it bears. 
Secondly, the present research confirms the importance of a component of envy 
that is widely acknowledged in envy theory, but has received little empirical attention – 
the intensified desire for the superior good of another person. While intense longing has 
been shown to be the most characteristic trait of envy in experiential studies (Bers & 
Rodin, 1984; Parrott & Smith, 1993; R. H. Smith et al., 1988), the data reported here 
demonstrate experimentally that becoming aware of an advantaged other can cause 
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desire. I contend that the intensified and frustrated desire for another person’s superior 
good or quality is at the core of experiencing envy and that it is driving the outcome of 
an envy-evoking situation. The present line of investigation may help to shift the focus 
of envy research from descriptive analyses to research that explores the cognitive 
processes in envious responding. 
Thirdly, in another contribution to this endeavor, this research is the first to 
demonstrate empirically that the exertion of self-control is crucial to understand envy – 
a notion that is implicit in many accounts of envy (e.g., Elster, 1999; Farber, 1966; 
Kant, 1797; R. H. Smith & Kim, 2007; Parrot, 2001). Applying a dual-process view of 
human thinking to the investigation of envious responding, the current evidence reveals 
that invidious discontent and desire are subject to self-regulatory processes, which alter 
the outcome of an envy-provoking situation. This offers an explanation why it has often 
been difficult to trace envy – the elusive “secret vice” (J. Epstein, 2003, p. 17) – 
empirically (Farber, 1966). Envy can thus be portrayed as an impulsive reaction, that is 
particular likely to affect behavior when resources to exert self-control are lacking. 
Consequences of attempts to control an envious emotional episode may account for a 
multitude of – often conflicting – notions about the elements and effects of envy. For 
example, as outlined in more detail in the introduction, a dual process view can explain 
why and when envy may lead to the disparagement of the superior good or quality of 
another person and not to intensified desire. Furthermore, it offers another hint of when 
envy may be transformed into other emotions such as admiration or resentment, only 
then when people have the capacity to change their emotional responding. 
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Impulse and Self-Control in Consumer Behavior 
Closely related to this thesis is research trying to unravel the impulsive 
determinants of consumer behavior (for an overview, see Faber & Vohs, 2004). Several 
recent theoretical approaches stress that consumers find themselves often in situations in 
which they are tempted by impulsive urges to consume, and that in consequence, they 
are put in a conflict between their desires and rational considerations (Baumeister, 
Sparks, Stillman, & Vohs, 2008; Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991; Strack et al., 2006). 
Most notable in the present context are experimental studies that have explored 
the relationship of self-control capacity and impulsive consumption. A number of 
studies have shown that if reflective processes are impaired, consumption behavior is 
determined by impulsive processes. For example, Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) studied 
the importance of affective product qualities in predicting choices under high cognitive 
load. Participants were given a choice between two products: an affectively positive but 
unhealthy chocolate cake or a comparatively less attractive but healthier fruit salad. 
When participants’ cognitive capacity was taxed by having them memorize a 7-digit 
number, their decision was driven by their impulsive desire and they preferred the 
chocolate cake over the fruit salad (see also Gibson, 2008). In related research, 
Hofmann and Friese (2008) assessed cognitive dietary restraint standards and implicit 
attitudes towards a specific candy and gave participants to taste the candy in an 
ostensible taste test. While for sober participants, the amount of consumed candy was 
mainly predicted by their restraint standard, for intoxicated participants, only the 
implicit attitudes toward the candy predicted consumption. Such a breakdown of self-
control in terms of dietary standards has also been induced by cognitive load (Ward & 
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Mann, 2000) and ego-depletion manipulations (Vohs & Heatherton, 2000). Vohs and 
Faber (2007) looked at the role of self-control in impulsive spending. Across three 
experiments, the depletion of self-control resources through tasks that required 
attentional control, thought suppression, and emotional modulation led to a higher 
willingness to pay and actual overspending in subsequent buying situations. 
These studies show that whether purchasing and consumption are determined by 
impulsive factors hinges on the capacity to exert self-control. The present findings 
contribute to and extend this line of research. While replicating that impulsive 
responding and purchasing is most likely when mental capacity is constrained, they 
identify the social context as an important source of the content and elicitation of 
impulses in a given situation. When under cognitive load, participants impulsively 
longed for the better good that their neighbor had. 
Future Directions 
Several limitations to the current studies may provide the first useful avenues for 
future research. Admittedly, breadth and level of detail of the measures assessing 
participants’ emotional experience in the current studies were limited. This restriction 
was intentional and is owed both to the procedural requirements of field experiments 
and the cognitive load manipulation, as well as to the sensitive nature of envy, which 
prompted me to leave participants – who believed to participate in a study on taste 
preferences – uninformed about the true nature of the experiments. 
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Nevertheless, I am confident that participants indeed experienced envy, and not 
related emotions such as admiration or resentment. Experiment 1’s self-report measures 
show that participants’ affective response to an advantaged other was clearly negative. 
They were unhappy and angry, which is inconsistent with an affectively positive 
emotion such as pure admiration. Furthermore, I put much effort in the experiments to 
ensure that the assignment procedure of the foods was (albeit only seemingly in some 
experiments) objectively fair – the foods were assigned randomly by the computer, and 
accordingly not due to any action or characteristic of the experimental partner or 
confederate. Hence, participants are unlikely to have felt righteous resentment (R. H. 
Smith & Kim, 2007). This also excludes the related construct of relative deprivation 
(e.g., Crosby, Muehrer, & Loewenstein, 1986; J. M. Olson & Hazlewood, 1986) as an 
explanation, which predicts negative emotional reactions in response to unequal 
outcomes produced by unfair procedures or events. Finally, participants themselves 
perceived the term “envy” as descriptive for their emotional state in Experiments 1 and 
2, and the degree to which they did mediated the effect of the experimental 
manipulations on Experiment 2’s indicator of desire for the superior product.  
Notwithstanding, future research could elucidate the emotional response of 
participants in the present experimental paradigm in more detail. This would allow 
investigating whether the pattern of high load participants’ emotional experience was 
similar to the non-malicious or malicious envy episodes described by some of Van de 
Ven et al.’s (2009) participants, and explore the conditions that lead to malicious ill will 
in envy. Furthermore, more fine-grained measures might clarify how participants in the 
low load condition experienced the situation emotionally. For example, they may have 
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transformed their emotional response in a more positive emotion, such as admiration. A 
way to circumvent the procedural limitations posed by using cognitive load 
manipulations simultaneously with the measures of interest might be to manipulate 
alcohol intoxication in the lab, or to use ego depletion manipulations (Baumeister et al., 
1998) to manipulate self-regulatory resources. 
More generally, it would be interesting to examine directly how people coped 
with the envy-evoking situation and the timing thereof. The present findings provide 
only incomplete information with regard to this question. Participants did not express 
discontent and envy when being sober or when assigned to the low cognitive load 
conditions. Furthermore, these participants did not show the behavioral consequences of 
increased desire. Rather, there was tentative evidence for decreased desire. For the 
reason that Experiment 4’s results were obtained using an indirect (and thus difficult to 
control) measure of participants’ approach tendency toward the envy-evoking good, it is 
unlikely that low load participants merely used the response-focused emotion regulation 
strategy of suppressing overt behavior. Instead, it seems more likely that they 
cognitively changed the meaning of the envy-evoking situation (for example the 
meaning of the envy stimulus or of their relation to the neighbor). But were they able to 
do so from the outset and prevented envy at all, or did they respond to their negative 
experience? Physiological measures of emotional arousal, such as skin conductance 
level, may provide a means to elucidate the course of envious responding and when and 
how people deal with it. 
Future research should also investigate more precisely the cognitive 
consequences that are associated with perceiving a desired fortune in the hands of 
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another person and how they result in an increased desire towards this fortune. A useful 
framework may be provided by adopting the perspective of social cognitive work on 
automatic goal pursuit. A plethora of recent findings demonstrates that goals can be 
activated and pursued even in the absence of attentional capacity (Dijksterhuis, 
Chartrand, & Aarts, 2007). Perceiving someone who possesses something which we 
desire and thus aim to acquire ourselves might be seen as a situation that leads to the 
activation of this goal. Several findings on the elicitation and the cognitive mechanics of 
automatic goal pursuit match this notion. For example, perceiving goal related behavior 
of other persons can activate the goal in the perceiver (Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 
2004). Also, physical objects related to goals can activate their pursuit (Kay, Wheeler, 
Bargh, & Ross, 2004). Furthermore, the automatic evaluation of objects is sensitive to 
their relevance for goal attainment (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004).  
Several new hypotheses may be derived from this perspective. For example, 
attentional processes might be an interesting point of departure. Recent evidence 
suggests that motivational states can adaptively tune the attentional system so that 
attention is involuntarily captured by motivationally relevant environmental stimuli 
(Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Maner, Gailliot, Rouby, & Miller, 2007; Moskowitz, 
2002). In line with this notion, envy is often associated with the idea that attention is 
caught by the desired object (e.g., Parrott, 2001; see also Introduction and Theoretical 
Background section here). Part of this may also be reflected in the beliefs about the 
“evil eye” of an envier (Foster, 1972). Thus, becoming aware of another person 
possessing a desired object may result in “attentional adhesion” to this object, which 
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might be detected in experimental paradigms such as the dot probe visual cuing task 
(MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). 
Motivational processes have also been shown to affect basic perceptual 
processes. For example, fluid deprivation and the activated goal to drink have been 
shown to increase size estimations of a glass of water (Veltkamp, Aarts, & Custers, 
2008; see also, Bruner & Goodman, 1947). Relatedly, Balcetis and Dunning (2006) 
have demonstrated that people disambiguate and perceive ambiguous figures in terms of 
their active goals, providing evidence for a functional understanding of perception 
(Bruner & Goodman, 1947). Thus, another prediction that can be derived from a 
motivational perspective is that envy should affect the visual perception of an envy-
evoking stimulus, leading to overestimations of its size (a mechanism that may have 
contributed to the higher willingness to pay in Experiment 2 of the present research) and 
an increased likelihood of detecting the envy object in ambiguous situations. 
To analyze the cognitive underpinnings of envious desire more closely, one 
might also consider the distinction between wanting something and liking something. 
Here, I have implicitly equated the two notions. However, in their research on drug 
addiction, Robinson and Berridge (1993, 2001) argue that wanting and liking may in 
fact represent distinct elements of motivation, and that they are based on different neural 
structures. While liking refers to the hedonic qualities of a stimulus (e.g., the 
pleasurable or euphoric effects of a drug), wanting refers to the incentive salience of it 
and is more directly associated with approach-related behavior. While liking and 
wanting may often converge, they may also be separable in specific conditions (e.g., 
after repeated drug use, wanting may persist in the absence of liking). Based on the 
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arguments presented here, envy should be more strongly associated with an increase in 
wanting the envy-evoking object, and not necessarily with an increase in liking it. This 
idea could be tested by using an implicit evaluation measure alongside with an 
approach-avoidance task. 
Finally, the research presented here might also profit from applying an 
individual differences perspective. People differ in several characteristics that are highly 
relevant for the presented theoretical framework. For example, some people are more 
prone to be envious than others in general (R. H. Smith, Parrott, Diener, Hoyle, & Kim, 
1999). Furthermore, there is variation in the capacity to exert self-control (e.g., 
Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004), as well as in working memory capacity, which 
is related to the self-control of emotional expression and experience (e.g., Schmeichel et 
al., 2008). Incorporating these variables may explain additional variance in how people 
respond to the experimental manipulations used to evoke envy in the current studies. 
Individual differences may also help to discern the consequences of the discrete 
motivations that should foster self-regulation in the case of envy. In parallel to the 
findings of research on motivations to respond without prejudice (Plant & Devine, 
1998), internal motivations to control envy (such as the hedonic motivation to decrease 
the associated negative affect) should result in the intrapsychic reduction of envious 
responding. In contrast, if people are predominantly motivated externally, i.e., by 
normative considerations, they should mainly control public signs of envy. As it has 
been argued that in some cultures envy has become a more accepted emotion in recent 
time (e.g., Matt, 2003), this question might also be addressed by a cross-cultural 
approach. 
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Applied Perspectives 
The conditions that led to more envy and a sizable increase in willingness to pay 
and purchase probability in the current experiments indicate that this particular 
emotional process may play an important role in influencing consumer behavior. 
Modern consumer societies not only provide abundant opportunities to compare own 
possessions to those of (superior) other people, but also offer nearly limitless occasions 
to engage in consumption. Faber and Vohs (2004) argue that the increased temporal or 
physical proximity (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991) of consumers to desired products has 
greatly augmented the importance of impulsive precursors of consumption in recent 
times. For example, products have come closer to the consumer by the widespread use 
of direct marketing techniques, allowing people to make purchases without having to 
wait or travel to a store. Technological changes contribute to this tendency, making it 
possible to buy virtually every product at the press of a button (Faber & Vohs, 2004). 
Furthermore, many settings of consumer decisions can be assumed to lead to a 
diminished mental capacity and thus to a constrained ability to exert self-control. For 
example, it has been argued that the number of options and thus choices that people can 
and must make when selecting products has increased exponentially over the last 
decades posing steadily rising demands on the limited mental resources of consumers 
(Vohs et al., 2008). Closely related, making deliberate, effortful choices itself has been 
shown to use up self regulatory resources (Vohs et al., 2008). Another reasonable 
assumption is that time pressure is an important factor in consumer decisions (e.g., Park, 
Iyer, & Smith, 1989). Thus, in many consumption situations, a constrained capability to 
exert self-control may be the rule rather than the exception. 
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An interesting example in this context is the psychology of auction situations. 
Auctions are an extensively used selling method, and a typical outcome is overbidding: 
people give bids that are too high given the value of the good (e.g., Delgado, Schotter, 
Ozbay, & Phelps, 2008; Ku, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2005). Economists often explain 
this effect by referring to the notion of risk aversion, according to which the bid is 
influence by the motivation to influence the probability of the outcome. Another 
explanation is the expected “joy of winning”. However, there is experimental evidence 
that overbidding is related to the anticipation of the unpleasant state associated with 
losing the auction (Delgado et al., 2008). Furthermore, Ku et al. (2005) stress the role of 
the escalation of commitment and rivalry in what they call “auction fever”. Their data 
suggest that both variables can cause overbidding and that this effect is mediated by 
“competitive” arousal. In the light of the current experiments, one might argue that envy 
is another (or partly overlapping) mechanism contributing to overbidding. Situational 
variables that should foster envious responding are present in many auction situations. 
Usually, both the (highly desired) object of the auction and one (or more) competitors 
are highly salient and in close proximity (albeit only their symbolic representation in the 
case of online auctions). Furthermore, many auction types imply high time pressure 
during their final stage. Thus, the mediating mechanism of a bid that exceeds the 
objective value of a good may be the envious impulse towards the competitor who has 
the highest bid at this moment and thus is the (virtual) possessor of the desired good. 
In the light of the present findings, trying to provoke envy might at first glance 
seem a promising marketing strategy. If the default consequence of envy is an 
intensified longing and striving for the object or quality in question then causing envy 
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might increase the perceived desirability and in turn amplify sales. In fact, marketers 
often follow this strategy. For example, by showing advertisements depicting attractive 
people who enjoy the superior products they seemingly possess (Belk, 2008). According 
to the provocative title of a brochure of the marketing company Young & Rubicam 
(2006; cited in Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009) “All you need is envy”. 
However, the current results show that this judgment is premature: Putting participants 
in an envy-provoking situation only led to more signs of heightened desire, when they 
were deprived of their cognitive resources. Thus, when trying to evoke and capitalize on 
envious impulses marketers would have to try to do so only when people’s capacity to 
exert self-control is constrained, a factor that might be very difficult to control. What 
should discourage them even more from trying to do so are the potential “sour grapes” 
and “sweet lemon” effects, which may lead to a decreased desire for the product that is 
marketed in a way to produce envy and to more satisfaction with the products that 
people already own. 
Sometimes, envy is even openly used as a marketing device, as evidenced by the 
names of consumer products such as the “enV” mobile phone series by LG, “Nvidia” 
computer components, or the “Envy” perfume by Gucci. In these cases, the intention 
probably is to make use of another way in which envy might be important in marketing. 
Products are often marketed with the (explicit or implicit) promise to provoke envy in 
the social environment of their buyers. Here, the aim is to take advantage of the human 
tendency to engage in conspicuous consumption (Veblen, 1899), which is the spending 
on goods with the sole purpose to display ones superiority and social status. The present 
findings are less directly related to this phenomenon. Still, one may speculate how self-
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control is related to conspicuous consumption. The prospect of being envied by others 
might be something that people spontaneously find very positive upon perceiving the 
opportunity to gain an advantage and raise their social status. Irvine (2006) argues that 
people have a desire to cause envy in others. On the other hand, social norms should 
inhibit such a behavior, as argued by sociologists. An example is provided by anecdotal 
evidence on the cultural instilment of the fear of being the target of “the evil eye”, 
which is supposedly aimed at preventing the negative consequences of envy (e.g., 
Douglas & Isherwood, 1979; Foster, 1972;). Therefore, on second thought, people 
might find the prospect of being envied less appealing. Consequentially, they might be 
particularly vulnerable to the propensity to engage in conspicuous consumption when 
being deprived of mental resources. 
The implications of the present theoretical arguments and experimental findings 
can also be viewed from another applied perspective: Most relevant for consumers 
might be the question of which ways are best to escape the detrimental effects of envy 
when making judgments and decisions. Gross’ (1998a) classification of the ways of 
emotion regulation offers a framework to answer that question. If avoiding the 
potentially envy-involving situation is not an option then people may try to alter it. 
Specifically, people should ensure that they are able to devote the necessary resources to 
keep envy from biasing them. For example, they could postpone a decision to gain more 
time for deliberate thought. They might also try to use strategies that help them reduce 
the amount of information and thus cognitive overload and the complexity of the 
decision. When having enough cognitive resources, participants of the present 
experiments did not fall for envy’s tendency to increase the desire for the superior good 
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of a neighbor (but note that there were some indications of evaluative contrast effects). 
As mentioned above, a possible explanation for this effect is that they have resorted to 
the means of cognitively changing the meaning they ascribe to the envy-evoking object. 
In the case of consumer decisions, a way to accomplish this may be to deliberately focus 
on the costs of making a purchase, such as considering other uses of the money, or to 
think about negative aspects of the product and the negative consequences of purchasing 
it (see also Faber & Vohs, 2004). Finally, provided they dispose of the necessary mental 
resources, consumers have the option to use a response-focused emotion regulation 
strategy such as suppressing the behavioral effects of envy. Future research should 
elaborate the effectiveness and the specific consequences of these envy-control 
mechanisms in consumer situations. 
Conclusion 
The present findings help understand the intricacies of envy and thus 
demonstrate the usefulness of applying a social cognitive approach to the investigation 
of envious thoughts, feelings, and behavior. The consequences of an envy-provoking 
situation hinge on people’s mental capacity to control and alter their emotional 
responding. Because envy is painful and norm-violating, people can be expected to try 
to control their overt as well as intrapsychic envious reactions. In the light of the 
multiple demands on people’s limited capacities, however, in many situations they are 
unlikely to prevail against their invidious impulse. Thus, in order to avoid being 
influenced by envy, people should steer clear from important decisions when they are 
fatigued, under time pressure, or overloaded with information. The present experiments 
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contribute to the knowledge about when and how emotion influences economic 
judgments and decisions. If uncontrolled, envy may lead to objectively unjustifiable 
overvaluations of products and options others have and may thus fuel irrationality in 
human decision making. 
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Stimuli used in the practice block of Experiment 4’s approach-avoidance task: 
 
 
Stimuli used in the target blocks of Experiment 4’s approach-avoidance task: 
 
   
